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Abstract 
In Being and Time, Heidegger demonstrates that Dasein's Being-one's-Self 
in its everydayness is the "They" [das Man] (see BT 167). The "They" who keeps 
saying “1” is shown to be an indefinite nobody that Dasein is in fact not itself. 
Yet, this inauthentic self is elaborated as a genuine self-showing of the 
phenomenon of Dasein. How do we understand this seemingly unthinkable 
explication of Dasein's self in its not being itself? This is the question of this 
thesis. This problem has to be rendered in view of Heidegger's understanding of 
Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. This understanding distinguishes the Dasein 
analytic from the traditional anthropology that presents man as present-at-hand. 
And in this understanding, the question of"who" ofDasein gains a new meaning 
which distinguishes the “1” from present-at-hand. The traditional anthropology is 
criticized for not seeing the phenomenon of the world as an ontological structure 
ofDasein. The world is not a sum-total of things but a referential totality wherein 
Dasein always fmds itself in the midst of intraworldly entities. Heidegger 
criticizes that Descartes' sum and Kant's “I think” are insufficient because they 
fail to recognize phenomenon of the world. He points out that whenever Dasein � -
says “1”，it does not express itself as a I-thing but an “I-am-in-the-world” The “1” 
who is a Being-in in the world is always a Being-alongside to the intraworldly 
things and a Being-with-one-another with the others. This “1” does not possess 
the certitude but is only an average anyone~the indefinite “They” However, this 
"They" belongs to the genuine existential structure of Dasein and it always 




















Table of Content 
Abstract 2 
^ ^ 3 
Table of Content 4 
Abbreviation 6 
Introduction 7 
A. The obvious answer to the who-question 8 
B. The structure of this Thesis 13 
Chapter I The Question of "Who" and the Question of Being 19 
A. Introduction 19 
B. The Question ofBeing and Dasein's Understanding ofBeing 22 
1. The clarification of the structure of the Question 22 
2. The circularity of the question 27 
C. Dasein's understanding ofBeing as its essential characteristic 30 
1. The preliminary indication of the meaning ofDasein 30 
� 
2. The analytic ofDasein as distinguished from Anthropology 36 
D. The question of who of Dasein 43 
E. Conclusion 49 
Chapter II Confronting Descartes，and Kant，s “I am，， 52 
A. Introduction 52 
B. The Criticism on the Cartesian Ego 54 
1. Indeterminacy of the sum 57 
4 
2. Indeterminacy of substantiality 60 
C. The Criticism on the Kantian Cogito 62 
1. The Paralogism ofPure Reason 64 
2. The fall back to the indeterminacy of substance 67 
3. Kant，s return to the res cogitans 70 
D. Conclusion 78 
Chapter III The everyday "1"一so close yet far away 81 
A. Introduction 81 
B. Dasein's everyday work-world 83 
1. The Heideggerian concept of the "world" 85 
2. The ontico-existentiell explication ofDasein's work-world 87 
3. The ontologico-existential explanation of worldhood 89 
4. The work-world and the lack of privilege ofDasein's I-here 93 
C. Dasein,s everyday with-world 97 
� 1 . The primacy of Dasein over the encountering of Other 99 
2. Dasein's everyday Being-I and the Others 102 





Text of Heidegger: 
BT Being and Time 
BP The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
BW The Basic Writings: revised and expanded edition 
HCT History of the Concept ofTime’ Prolegomena 
MFL The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, 
WCT What is Called Thinking? 
WT What is a Thing? 
o. 
Text of Kant: 





"Who is this Dasein?" Heidegger answers，“Because Dasein has in each case 
mineness [Jemeinigkeit], one must always use a personal pronoun when one 
addresses it: 'I am，，'you are”，(BT 68). What is more obvious than the “1” who 
this Dasein is? The question of “I am" is surely the most frequently studied 
problem in the philosophy. Perhaps, the Delphi inscription, "Know Thyself, has 
already determined the fate of philosophy. In Modem philosophy, Descartes 
discovers the “I am" as the first unshakable truth. The “1”，the “human subject" 
rises to the center of the Modem philosophical thinking. Heidegger says: 
It will be expected that ontology now takes the subject as exemplary 
entity and interprets the concept of Being by looking to the mode of 
Being of the subject~"that henceforth the subject's way of Being 
becomes an ontological problem. But that is precisely what does not 
happen (BP 123). 
The question of Being remains to be the "single thought" ofHeidegger.^ The 
question of who of Dasein is also posed in his way of questioning Being, 
Heidegger ihinks that the ontological determination is missing in the history of 
philosophy. The answer to the question, ‘‘I am”, has not been clearly explicated as 
well. Does the 'T' stand for me and nothing further? In what way does Heidegger 
see that this answer is not good enough to the question? 
1 Otto p6ggeler, Martin Heidegger 's Path ofThinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and 
Sigmund Baiber, Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanity Press International, 1987， 
p.2. 
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A, The obvious answer to the who-question 
In §4 and §9 of Being and Time, Heidegger states that Dasein is an entity that 
its Being always remains to be an issue. In such an ontological determination, it 
implies that Dasein is always mine. Dasein expresses its mineness ontically as an 
“1” However, Heidegger thinks that the linkage between the “1” and Dasein's 
mineness has to be determined ontologically. Just because the assertion “I am this 
Dasein" seems to be "closest" and inconspicuous, the ontological structure of 
Dasein's Being-a-Self is overlooked. Moreover, the existential characteristic of 
Dasein's mineness is being missed out. Heidegger regards the ontically closest 
'T' the reason that makes Dasein ontologically "farthest" to itself. In §5, 
Heidegger states that: 
Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is 
closest [das ndchste\. we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of 
this, or rather for just this reason, it is ontologically that which is 
farthest (BT 36). 
Each of us ourselves, I myself, is the who of one's own Dasein; I myself am this �“ • 
Dasein. That is the "closest" answerjng to the question that one does not doubt. 
However, the word “closest” [das ndchste] is put into quotation marks to express 
Heidegger's doubt on its given obviousness. 
“Ontical,，[Ontisch] and "ontological" [ontologisch] in the Heideggerian 
language mean explicitly different. It is outlined in BT 31 that "ontological" level 
ofexplication refers to a focus on Being whereas "ontical" level of analysis refers 
to the entities in question and the facts about them. In most occasions, Heidegger 
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refers ontical inquiry to positive science—the study of entities that Being is either 
presumed as a thing or simply ignored. Following this terminological 
understanding, to say that Dasein is ontically closest to itself but ontologically 
farthest implies that the ontical whoness of Dasein is under question and requires 
an ontological affirmation. The ontical understanding of “1” does not reveal the 
primordial phenomenon of Dasein~its Being. In the Heideggerian 
phenomenological description, Dasein's ontological famess itself can be 
； 
expressed as "Dasein's own whoness is concealed or covered up by the answer: ‘I 
am it.，” Heidegger thinks that until the Dasein's Being is clarified, Dasein is 
never really “close，’ to itself. 
Dasein's genuine closeness to itself must be related to the unconcealment of 
its Being. In "The Ends ofMan," Derrida points out that the analogy of proximity 
and distance appears again in Letter on Humanism in regards to Dasein's 
proximity to (the truth of) Being in terms of its existence and it is a clearing of 
Being (see BW 233-234). Derrida explains further that Dasein is the “Da of 
sein,,——the presence of Being.^ In Being and Time, Heidegger thinks that only 
when Dasein's Being is fully revealed in the ontological inquiry, the 
understanding of Dasein can considered genuine. Heidegger says in the Letter on � 
Humanism that humanism has not given Dasein its proper prestige in regards to 
2 In Letter on Humanism, Heidegger writes, "Being is farther than all beings and is 
yet nearer to man than every being, be it a rock ... be it an angel or God. Being is 
the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from man. Man at first clings always and 
only to beings. But when thinking represents beings as beings it no doubt relates to 
Being" (BW 234). 
See Jacques Derrida, "Ends of Man," Margins of Philosophy," trans. Alan Bass, 
Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1982, p.126-128. 
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its proximity to Being. We see that the genuine proximity, in Heidegger's mind, 
is according to a ontological clearance of Dasein's own Being. Thus, an ontical 
certainty that is formed by the common usage ofDasein's self-proclamation to be 
"I am" is not a real doseness? 
By proclaiming “I am this Dasein”, Dasein as an “I” is immediately given; it 
is so obvious. This ontical understanding also presumes that this “1” as a subject 
is to be explicated for an answering to the who-question. However, from the 
phenomenological point of view, the immediate ontical givenness and 
obviousness of the I as a subject (the entity that I myself am) are put into 
question. Heidegger questions that whether what is presumed to be given and 
unmistakably described can do justice to the stock of phenomena belonging to the 
everyday Dasein (see BT 150). The mere ontical content of the assertion that “I 
am this Dasein" does only shows that Dasein is an entity but does not explicates 
its Being. According to the principle of Heideggerian phenomenology, “To the 
things themselves", an interpretation of the I demands a full explication of its 
Being. Heidegger states: 
If，in arriving at ontico-ontological assertions, one is to exhibit the 
� ‘ 
3 Von Herrmann points out that Dasein finds itself closest，as its immediate 
neighbor, only if it compares its self with the extemal others. Then Dasein's self is 
taken as an object. Furthermore, although the self as object is closest to the self as 
subject, there is always an un-surpassed distance between them. It makes them 
"neighbors" to one another but never a whole. Thus, the "closeness" aIways implies 
a distance which is created by the theoretical opposition of subject and object. 
See W.F. Von Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phdnomenologie des Daseins: Eine 
Erlduterung von "Sein und Ziet", Band 1 Einleitung die Exposition der Farge nach 
dem Sinn von Sein, Frankurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987，pp.154-158. 
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phenomena in terms of the kind ofBeing which the entities themselves 
possesses, and if this way of exhibiting them is to retain its priority over 
even the most usual and obvious of answers and over whatever ways of 
formulating problems may have been derived from those answers, then 
the phenomenological interpretation ofDasein must be defended against 
a perversion of our problematic when we come to the question we are 
about to formulate (BT 151). 
The phenomenological interpretation of Dasein does not allow the ontical 
obviousness to override the phenomena of Dasein itself. Heidegger does not 
consider the “1” the subject. And the phenomenon ofDasein,s I-saying remains 
the problematic of Being and Time. Heidegger stresses, “the word T is to be 
understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator” fBT 151-2). 
This approach to the phenomenon goes beyond the traditional onitcal 
understanding of the I as a subject, soul or spirit. To a large extend, Heidegger 
attributes Husserl for his suspending the ontical obviousness of the “1” to study 
its structure of givenness and that Husserl arrives at an understanding that the 
form of “giving” of the 'T' is a mere, formal, reflective awareness. He also points 
out that this understanding of the giving of the 'T' even "affords access to a �— 
phenomenological problematic in its own right, which has in principle the 
signification of providing a framework as a ‘formal phenomenology of 
consciousness'" (BT 151). However, "the mere, formal, reflective awareness of 
the ‘1”，(BT 151) in Husserl's studies does not explicate the phenomenal content 
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of Dasein's I-saying to its fullest.^ Heidegger demands a concrete explication of 
this formal I in Dasein's everyday I-saying. 
Therefore, the seemingly closest and obvious “1，’ is suspended and the 
priority of interpretation is given to the everyday “1” By such a displacement, the 
phenomenal content of Dasein's undifferentiated everyday I-saying becomes the 
issue. The subject to be explicated is in fact not an “1” but the I-saying of Dasein. 
Hence, Heidegger writes: 
It may well be that it is always ontically correct to say of this entity that 
“1” am it. Yet the ontological analytic which makes use of such 
assertions must make certain reservations about them in principle (BT 
4 For a detail discussion of the relatedness of Heidegger and Husserl in regard to 
their approaches to the question ofI, see Michael Theunissen, The Other: Studies in 
the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber, trans. Christopher 
Macann, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986, Chapter 5. 
Theunissen points out that Husserl's transcendental ego does not escape the 
Heideggerian objection of taking the I as presence-at-hand~the transcendental ego 
is the “I of intentionality". Yet, Heidegger recognizes that the transcendental 
concept of the ego presumes the phenomenon of world, bi Heidegger's view, the 
phenomenon I (saying-I) is constituted by the mode of Being of Dasein as Being-in-� “ • 
the-world. Together with the world, my own Dasein projects itself as an I. The 
projecting self is regarded the original phenomenal basis of the Being of the 'T'. 
Considering the 'T' as formal awareness shows that Husserl has the insight of the 
worldliness of the ego (or Dasein) and this is deemed to be an access to the genuine 
phenomenon of Dasein. Theunissen points out that Heidegger does not find the 
answer to the question ofwho ofDasein as a formal statement that Dasein "is an 1" 
satisfying. Heidegger thinks that if the transcendental phenomenology predelineates 
the formal framework of the genuine phenomenon I，it must be the task of the 
Dasein analytic to flU out this framework concretely. Theunissen concludes, "the 
relation of the truly phenomenological phenomenology of Husserl to fundamental 
ontology is that of an empty indication to its concreteness" (73). 
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151). 
Accordingly, Heidegger only takes the word “1” in the sense of a non-committal 
formal indicator. That, it indicates something which may perhaps reveal itself as 
its “opposite’，(the not-I or the "They" [das Man]) in some particular phenomenal 
context of Being. In saying “1”，the word “1” only formally indicates that Dasein 
is itself. In terms of Being and Time, it is the phenomenon of Dasein's mineness 
[Jemeinigkeit]. The who-question therefore aims specifically at an explication of 
the Being of Dasein regarding its Being-mine. Hence, the question of who of 
Dasein no longer belongs to one of the traditional metaphysical who-question that 
searches for the “I-thing” 
Since the answering of Dasein's everyday whoness is indeed an 
interpretation of its Being-a-Self instead of a I-thing. This mode of Being-a-Self 
is to be referred back to the everyday context that Dasein is its self when it takes 
a bus, uses a hammer and writes on a paper. Rather，the task is to explicate the 
mode of Being that Dasein is dealing with its everyday life. This everydayness is 
an existential description of how Dasein exists in the world as a Being-in-the-
world. Hence, we shall go into the question of the “world，，of everydayness in 
order to present the mode ofBeing ofDasein's Being-a-Self. 
B- The structure ofthis Thesis 
This thesis aims at an exposition of Heidegger's questioning of this who-
question. We shall see that Heidegger's questioning comes to be a circle: it is an 
interpretation of the answer “I am this Dasein". Heidegger starts with the insight 
of the Cartesian “cogito sum,, that is also the hallmark of Modem thinking. 
13 
However, Heidegger thinks that Descartes' effort of investigation of the cogito 
does not lead him to discover the full meaning of the ontological insight of the 
Being of the ego. Afterwards, he maintains that Kant has correctly analyzed the 
phenomenal content of I-saying so as to discover a non-substantial “I think". 
However, Kant is criticized to have taken the “I think" as another kind of 
“‘subject，，一hypokeimenon again. Heidegger's most severe objection toward Kant 
and Descartes remains on their taking Dasein or the ego as a present-at-hand 
[Vorhanden]. His criticism is undertaken on two understandings of the 
ontological structure of Dasein: (1) The Dasein is ontologically distinct from 
other entities because it has a peculiar relationship of its own Being~~ 
understanding of Being [Seinsverstandnis]； (2) Dasein is a Being-in-the-world 
[In-der-Welt-sein]. The phenomenon of world is the structure of existence of 
Dasein. Heidegger sees that the world is a totality of relation in which Dasein is 
involved with all things within the world. Entities are, nothwithstanding Dasein is 
or is absent.5 Thus, the world is discussed as something structural of Dasein's 
existence instead of an external object. 
Heidegger's discontent with Descartes and Kant rests on their neglect of the 
phenomenon of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. As far as Dasein is a Being-in-� -
the-world, the phenomenal content of its I-saying is to be re-appropriated. 
Whenever Dasein says “I think", it has to be understood as an “1 think 
something"; Saying “1” expresses Dasein as a “I-am-in-the-world.’，Heidegger 
says: 
If, in the ontology of Dasein, we "take our departure" from a worldless 
'MFL§11. 14 
'T ' in order to provide this “1” with an Object and an ontologically 
baseless relation to tat Object, then we have "presupposed" not too 
much, but too little (BT 363). 
Hence, the question remains to be: "what is the phenomenal content of the ‘I-am-
in-the-world'?" hi the existential analytic, Dasein,s T，in its everydayness is 
revealed as a "They" [das Man].^ Does Heidegger dismiss our everyday most 
obvious answering to the question? If I am the “They，,，how do I perceive this 
astonishing answer? However, at the end of the thesis, we shall see that 
Heidegger explains that the mode of Being of the “They”，Dasein's 
"inauthenticity" [Uneigentlichkeit], belongs in fact to Dasein's own mineness. By 
‘ so doing, he retums the “I am" to Dasein; he also settles that Dasein, as a Being-
in-the-world, its Being-lost in the “They’，is indeed its own facticity. He says: 
This undifferentiated character ofDasein's everydayness is not nothing, 
but a positive phenomenal characteristic to this entity. Out of this kind 
ofBeing~~and back into it again~is all existing, such as it is (BT 69). 
Henceforth, our exposition of Heidegger's questioning does not seek for a new 
answer to the who-question but an understanding of the meaning of Heidegger's � ‘ 
phenomenological elucidation of the answer. 
However, since the question of Being is the core question of Being and 
Time, how do we understand the question of "who" of Dasein in the context of 
6 Heidegger writes, ''proximally, it is not 'F, in the sense ofmy own Self, that 'am', 
but rather the Others, whose is that ofthe 'They'. In terms of the ‘They’ and as the 
‘They，，I am ‘given’ proximaUy to ‘myself,，(BT 167). 
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the Being-question? This is the task of chapter I to explain how the question of 
the "who" is incorporated in the question of Being, and how this linkage 
disassociates Heidegger's questioning from the traditional anthropology. 
Afterwards, we shall establish that the aim of the question of the "who" ofDasein 
is posed in a specific sense of “whoness’，(BP 120). It does not ask about a 
"what", or 'T', or ‘‘subject” but the phenomenal content ofI-saying. 
Chapter II will focus on Heidegger's historical approach to the answer of the 
who-question, i.e., the “I am” Heidegger thinks that Descartes and Kant are two 
most important philosophers: Descartes discovers the “sum,, as the foundation of 
the Modem philosophy; whereas Kant corrects the direction of research on the 
“1” from a “res cogitans,, to an “I think". However, Heidegger maintains that 
both Descartes and Kant have not yet answered this question of Being of the I. 
And that not only the answer is missing，but the question itself is also hardly 
found. The most important mistake, Heidegger thinks, is the lack of 
understanding of Dasein's ontological difference. Both Descartes and Kant are 
criticized for taking Dasein as a present-at-hand. Heidegger regards the effort of 
Kant and Descartes to establish a proof of existence of the external world 
insufficient. It is not due to the inadequacy of the proofs, but the wrong � • 
ontological presumption of Dasein. However, the most important conclusion of 
his confrontation of Kant and Descartes is that “in saying T，I have in view the 
entity which in each case I am as an ‘I-am-in-the-world’，，（BT 368). 
Then, the phenomenon ofI-saying is determined as more fundamental to the 
phenomenon of world. What is the meaning of the world? And what does the 
phenomenon of Dasein as an "I-am-in-the-world" mean? We shall see that 
Heidegger does not start from a theoretical point of view. Rather, he begins at the 
16 
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level of praxis, Dasein's everydayness. He thinks that it is the primary way that 
the phenomenon ofDasein shows itself without any theoretical obstruction. From 
Dasein's everydayness, its existential structures is determined as Being-in in the 
world. That the world is the "wherein" [Woriri] Dasein finds itself and concerns 
itself with the involvement. Furthermore, the world is not a "private" world of 
Dasein. It is rather a public world，the "with-world" [Mitwelt]. In the publicness 
of the with-world, Dasein is not only a Being-with-one-another, it is also “lost” It 
is because the self-understanding of Dasein is actually absorbed in the way that 
the Others talk in the idle talk. Thus, the idle talk is the most powerful force to 
"take away" Dasein's own Being (BT 164). 
Heidegger points out that the everyday Dasein, who says “1”，is not its 
authentic Self. Instead, it is the "They" [das Man\ The term “das Man,, refers to 
a “one”，or "anyone"; it is an indefinite impersonal pronoun. Heidegger says，it is 
"nobody" (166 [128]). Thus, we can understand why Heidegger states in §5 that 
the ontically closest “I am" is ontologically farthest. However, Heidegger also 
noted in §25 that in fact the “I am" is ontically unclear. 
In the concluding chapter, we need to re-establish a path of thinking of 
Heidegger.�Starting form the everydayness, and arrives at the “They”，does 
Heidegger aim at providing a new answer to the question of “who” of Dasein? 
We shall explain what he means by everydayness and inauthenticity. The 
everyday way of answering the question of "who", as well as the everyday mode 
ofBeing of Dasein is in fact an existential determination of Dasein itself. To say 
that Dasein is “nof, its own self in the everydayness does not refute the answer “I 
am” If the everyday undifferentiated mode of Being is existentially determined, 
and it will tum out to be a genuine way of expressing Dasein's existence and 
17 
I 
mineness, the answer will remain valid. In the final analysis, there is not 





The Question of "Who" and the Question of 
Being 
Clearing the way toward an non-Anthropological access to 
Dasein 
A. Introduction 
This chapter aims at settling the direction of research ofDasein's whoness in 
the context of Heidegger's question of Being in Being and Time. We shall show 
that the who-question of Dasein is in fact the guiding question to the Dasein 
analytic and it is also the access to the question of Being. In the Heideggerian 
way of posing the question of Being, the questioning itself is indeed already 
pointing to the way of answering. Of course, it is well known that the question 
has not been fully answered in Being and Time. However, in the whole enterprise 
ofHeidegger's thinking, the question always remains as the guiding thread of his 
thought. As Otto Poggeler reported that Heidegger describes his thinking as a 
traveling along the way, “To head towards a single star”/ Thus, if we expect a 
full answer, we seem to be unaware of the thinker's style. However, in this thesis, 
we shall not go into the detail of the whole idea of the question of Being. Instead, 
we shall only elaborate the formulation of this question in Being and Time. 
7 Otto P6ggeler, Martin Heidegger，s path of thinking, p.2. 
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Moreover, our aim is to show how the question of"who" ofDasein is an essential 
starting point of the question ofBeing. 
In the untitled Preface of Being and Time, Heidegger quotes Plato's Sophist 
244a to express the obscurity of the question ofBeing: 
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you 
use the expression “being,,. We, however, who use to think we 
understood it, have now become perplexed". He thinks that “not only 
that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the question itself is 
obscure and without direction (BT 24). 
In Being and Time, explicitly "formulating" the question is the issue. The Dasein 
analytic is considered as an essential moment to the formulation of the question 
of Being. In the following discussion, we shall see that questioning the question 
of Being is indeed intrinsic to Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being 
[vorontoIogische Seinsverstdndnis]一it is a radicalize expression of Dasein's 
characteristic (BT 35). He said, “The very asking of this question is an entity's 
mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired 
about~~namely. Being" (BT 27). It means that on the one hand, the questioning � 
Being must presume an understanding of Being. On the other hand, posing the 
question ofBeing is an essential characteristic ofDasein. Namely, the question of 
Being is nothing accidental but the questioning itself is a constitutive 
characteristic of Dasein. As so formulated, a clarification of Dasein's Being is 
considered essential as an access to the question ofBeing. 
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The who-question is regarded as the access to an essential character of 
Dasein (BT 71). It is, moreover, the access to the question of Being. Heidegger 
says in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, "the Dasein is not constituted by 
whatness but~if we may coin the expression~by whones'' (BP 120). In the 
traditional sense, the who-question is indeed a question of the person, the subject, 
the soul, or the 1. If we raise the question of Dasein as an entity, we can only 
arrive at an answer in terms of the whatness of the entity but not the whoness of 
\ 
Dasein. Person, soul, subject and the like are studied in the tradition as "present-
at-hand". However, present-at-hand is not the proper mode of Being of Dasein 
but the Being of Dasein is called "existence" [Existenz] and mineness 
'Jemeinigkeit], Establishing the contrast of Dasein against the present-at-hand is a 
main task in Being and Time. In Heidegger's criticism on the tradition of 
anthropology, the main attack remains to be the indifference to Dasein's 
ontological difference from the present-at-hand. 
The answer to the who-question does not give a thing but an I, you, and we 
(BP 120). Here the “1” that is given from the answering of the question has a 
specific place in the Dasein analytic. The “1” is not treated as a thing present-at-
hand but approached with regards to the mineness of Dasein. This ‘T’ is �“ 
specifically considered in the phenomenon ofDasein's I-saying. By so doing, the 
Heideggerian questioning ofDasein's whoness is a phenomenological explication 
of Dasein's I-saying. The problematic is not the I-thing itself, or the semantic 
meaning of the word T，. Rather, the problem remains to be the phenomenon of 
Dasein's self-expressing as a whole. In this sense, saying “1” implies Dasein's 
Being-an-I as its way of Being. Thus, the investigation of the “who，，of Dasein is 
worked out in a phenomenological interpretation ofDasein's "Being-an-I". 
21 
B. The Question of Being and Dasein's Understanding of 
Being 
Restating the question of Being is the cardinal theme of Being and Time. In 
the opening section, Heidegger states his discontent to the traditional ontology. 
He summarizes the history of ontology in three presuppositions that Being is 
universal, indefinable and self-evident (see BT 22-23). By so presuming, the 
meaning ofBeing is left in darkness and deemed unintelligible. Heidegger thinks 
that it is neither the answer of meaning of Being is lacking nor a thematic 
questioning of Being is held in a proper direction. For him，Plato's question of 
meaning of Being is still the most fundamental one (BT 31). Heidegger thinks 
that the question ofBeing is to be re-appropriated in a proper way by setting up a 
new direction of inquiry. In Being and Time, he points out that Being is not an 
entity and that the possibility for treated as an entity and that the questioning 
itself is nothing other than a radicalization of the tendency-of-Being of Dasein in 
its pre-ontological understanding of Being (BT 35). In the following discussion 
we shall discuss the significance of the Heideggerian formulation of the question 
ofBeing in a circular way which presupposes Dasein's understanding ofBeing. � -
1. The clarification of the structure of the Question 
In §2 of Being and Time the question of Being is posed. This question has 
three structural items: (1) Being is that which is asked about [Gefragte]. (2) The 
entity that is being interrogated [Befragte] is Dasein because of its ontico-
ontological priority of having the understanding of Being. (3) That which is to be 
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found out by the asking {Erfragte] is the meaning ofBeing. "What is the meaning 
of Being?" "We do not know what Being means" (BT 27), says Heidegger. 
However, there is a hint from the Gefragte: “Being is not an entity”，“it means the 
Being of entities". He adds, “Being lies in the fact that something is, and in its 
Being as it is” (BT 26), As that which is asked about. Being has to be conceived 
in a way of its own, essentially contrasting with the concepts in which entities 
acquire their determinate signification. Hence, the question of Being is distinct 
from all other questions ofentities, 
8 Where does the idea that "Being is not an entity" come from, if the meaning of 
Being is still unknown? Is it conceptual presupposition ofthe inquiry? bi The Basic 
Problems ofPhenomenology,’, Heidegger says，"The distinction ofBeing and being 
(entity) ispre-ontologically there, without an explicit concept ofBeing, latent in the 
Dasein 's existence” (BP 319, Heidegger's italic). There is disclosure ofBeing itself 
in Dasein's understanding ofBeing even ifit discloses only pre-ontologically. Such 
a disclosure is the constitution of Dasein's existence as long as Dasein exists (see 
BT §4). The ontological distinction is not an conceptual "assertion，，but a 
phenomenological description on the Being ofDasein. Jean-Luc Marion argues that 
ontological Difference has come to the forth even in Being and Time, although the 
term itselfdoes not appear. He thinks that if it is not the case, Heidegger's "Being is 
not an entity" in Being and Time would not have been raised. 
From the sentences about the distinction of Being and entity quoted above, one 
might try to compare it with the famous "ontological Difference" [ontologische 
Differenz]. Li fact, the term "ontological Difference" does not appear in Being and 
Time. But in the same year that Being and Time is published, Heidegger introduces 
"ontological difference" [ontologishe Unerscheid] of Being and entities in the 1927 
Marburg Lecture, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. It is described as the 
mode of existence of Dasein. It must be noted that the latent and implicit 
ontological difference [Unterscheid] in BP 319 has to be distinguished from his 
"ontological Difference" [Differenz] latter in Heidegger's "thinking of Being" after 
"the Tum". Obviously, the former has not been treated as a thematic problem. We 
shall not discuss the problem of continuity of Heidegger's thought in this thesis. Yet, 
I do believe that the insightful sentence "Being is not an entity" deserves a more 
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Although Being cannot be treated as an entity, it is possible to inquire about 
Being as the Being of an entity. The inquiry then needs to question about the 
Being of an entity. Which entity is the meaning of Being is to be discerned? 
Heidegger says, 
If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried 
through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself，then 
any treatment of it in line with the elucidation we have given requires us 
to explain how Being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be 
understood and conceptually grasped; ... Looking at something, 
understanding and conceiving it，choosing, access to it~ail these ways 
of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of 
Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. 
Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an 
entity~the inquirer~transparent in his own Being (BT 26-7). 
sophisticated illustration than that in the Being and Time and The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology. Li Identity and Difference, Heidegger elaborates the unexplained 
sentence 6f Being and Time: the problem of clarifying the Difference [Differenz] 
between "Being" and entity (being) n6eds a "stepping back" [Schrittzuriick] to what 
is unthought. The "step back" is the move of thinking toward the "clearing" 
[Lichtung] of Being through the "Difference" and the "between" among Being and 
beings. Difference [Differenz] then has nothing to do with distinction or difference 
[Unterscheid] which belongs to the representative understanding [Verstand] (see 
Indentity and Difference.. 51 -65). 
See Jean-Luc Marion, Reduction and Givenness, trans. Thomas A. Carlson， 
Evanston, HUnois: Northwestern University Press, 1998, Chapter 4 and Jacques 
Derrida, "Differ^ce", Margins of Philosophy, Alan Bass Trans” Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp.21-27. 
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Among other entities, Dasein the inquirer has a distinctive relationship to the 
question that makes it the Befragte, In addition to the structural determination 
that Dasein is the entity that is to be interrogated, Heidegger also points out that 
the ontological interrelation between Dasein and the question of Being. Dasein's 
peculiar relationship with the question of Being is revealed in its having an 
understanding of Being [Seinsverstandnis}. That is，whenever Dasein is 
questioning the question of Being of an entity, an understanding of Being is 
presupposed. Since an explicit explication of the question ofBeing and the Being 
of an entity demands a disclosure of Dasein's understanding ofBeing，Dasein is 
the most suitable entity to be the Befragte ofthe question. Therefore, the question 
of Being is directed to a question of the Being of Dasein. So，Being as the 
Gefragte is rendered provisionally in the Being ofDasein. 
Dasein's having the understanding of Being also determines the 
hermeneutical structure of inquiry: “Inquiry’ as a kind of seeking，must be guided 
beforehand by what is scmghf, (BT 25). That is to say, the questioning of the 
meaning of Being is essentially guided by Dasein's understanding of Being. 
Heidegger explains that we always conduct our activities in an understanding of 
Being and that the questioning of meaning of Being is an activity of Dasein (see � 
BT 25). That “out of this understanding ofBeing arise both the explicit question 
‘ . ‘ 
of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception’， 
(ibid). Dasein does not need a clear conception of "Being" in order to pose the 
question such as “what ‘is’ the meaning of Being?” or to answer that “Being 
‘is,...” 
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However, this understanding of Being is indefinite and vague. Heidegger 
sees that a clarification of this vague, undifferentiated yet self-evidenf 
understanding of Being is inevitable if the question of meaning ofBeing is to be 
worked out. The term "understanding of Being" is in need to be explained in 
order to carry on the discussion. However, a full explication of the term is 
impossible at the present stage of our discussion because this is the question that 
the entire published Being and Time is trying to clarify. For the moment, we shall 
only explain it in a preliminary way. “Understanding of Being" in German is 
/ 
formulated in one word, “Seinsverstdndnis”, it has to be understood as a unified 
whole. It is a "relationship-of-Being" [Seinsverhdltnis]; it means that it is not an 
"understanding" acquired by intellectual reflection. In the Heideggerian language, 
"understanding" always means “disclosure”，or "disclosedness". That is a 
phenomenological state of Being that Dasein is encountering to the self-
manifestation of something. In this sense, understanding of Being refers to the 
disclosedness of Being. Now the question ofBeing refers to the Being of Dasein, 
as long as it is, it is disclosed to Being. Understanding ofBeing is there as long as 
Dasein exists. Thus, the "understanding of Being is a relationship-to-Being” 
means that Dasein is disclosed to its Being in its Being. It is not a relationship 
“with” Being because this relationship is constitutive to Dasein's existence. 
Accordingly, understanding of Being is a “definite characteristic of Dasein's 
Being” (BT 32), its adequate explication then amount to a complete analytic of 
>•, 
the Being of Dasein. Regarding to the structural presupposition of understanding 
9 Heidegger says, “But this vague average understanding ofBeing is still a fact 
[Faktumr (Heidegger's italic, BT 25). 
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of Being, the question of Being therefore demands the analytic of Dasein's 
Bei^.io 
2. The circularity of the question 
We then come to the Heideggerian “circle” because the Being-question is 
interrogated in a circular way: The question of Being "presupposes" the 
understanding of Being. Heidegger emphasizes that this is not a circular 
reasoning, since deduction is not involved. Furthermore, he says, “it is quite 
impossible for there to be any 'circular argument' in formulating the question of 
Being; for in answering this question, the issue is not one of grounding something 
by such a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it by 
exhibiting them" (BT 28). In his view, all ontology presupposes an understanding 
of Being in a particular disclosive character of the question itsdf^i as we have 
demonstrated above. Heidegger writes. 
One can determine the nature of entities in their Being without 
necessarily having the explicit concept ofthe meaning ofBeing at one's 
disposal. Otherwise there could have been no ontological knowledge 
� ‘ 
10 The discovery of "understanding of Being" is indeed a very important theoretical 
move that Heidegger has made to establish his own method of phenomenology. 
This "presupposition" signifies his divergence from the Husserlian phenomenology. 
Wbile Husserl tries to establish a rigorous presuppositionless science based on the 
principle of evidence, Heidegger develops his heraieneutic of Being. For a detail 
discussion on this problem, see F. W. von Herrmann, Der Begrijf der 
Phanomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl, Frankurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermami, 1981 and張燥輝，《海德格與胡塞爾現象學》，臺北市：東大發 
行，1996，〈附錄〉. 
11 Heidegger's Plato ’s Sophist p. 310. 
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heretofore. One would hardly deny that factically there has been such 
knowledge. Of course "Being" has been presupposed in all ontology up 
till now, but not as a concept at one's disposal. (BT 27). 
The Being-question discloses itself in the understanding of Being. That is 
also the determination of the Being ofDasein. Thus, we see that the question and 
the answering itself are presupposed all at once. This disclosive character of the 
question of Being itself is also based on the Being of Dasein. The Being of 
Dasein has a character that Being is always "an issue” for Dasein (see BT §4 and 
§9). Jn this sense, the "circle" of the question is an ontological determination and 
the Heidegger's way of working out the question is in “an existential circular" 
way (BT 362). Caputo points out that Being and Time is indeed undertaken in a 
"strategic circle". The treatise begins with its outcome. Caputo calls this circular 
strategy the “Radical Hermeneutics". He says: 
Here there is no formal, deductive movement from premise to 
conclusion but a regressive, hermeneutic movement bent on explication, 
aus-legen, on unpacking the implicit components of an everyday 
functioning preunderstanding. The point is to raise a vague 
understanding to the level of an explicit concept，to move along a line 
from implicit to explicit? 
Circularity of the question of Being itself also implies the circularity of the 
Being of Dasein. That is，since that which is asked is the Being of Dasein，Being 
12 J. D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the 
Hermeneutic Project, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco, New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1998，pp. 67-8. 
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is somehow understood as long as Dasein is, i.e.’ in its existence. Heidegger says, 
"Every ontologically explicit question about Dasein's Being has had the way 
already prepared for it by the kind of Being which Dasein has" (BT 360). 
Therefore, the question of Being implies both Being and Dasein's understanding 
of Being. Dasein is essentially an entity that understands and in fact already 
understood itself, about its own Being (see BT 361). Thus, if the Being ofDasein 
is already presumed, posing the question ofBeing ofDasein is, again, a circle. 
The presupposition of understanding of Being is in fact an indication of the 
pre-understanding, or pre-theoretical understanding. As we have discussed in the 
last section, it is a fact but is still vague. It is vague in the sense that a determined 
structure of understanding is still missing. But if what is being asked is Being, 
where can we go for a “deeper” understanding than the understanding of Being? 
Heidegger says，“and if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our 
investigation does not then become a 'deep, one [tiensinnig\ nor does it puzzle 
out what stands behind Being" (BT 193). 
Hence, the "circle" is in fact not an obstacle but a necessary point of 
departure for the Heideggerian hermeneutical phenomenology. Having an 
understanding is not the end of the question, but it is the phenomenal content that 
is to be explicated further. Thus, the existential analytic of Dasein is indeed the 
task of working out the understanding ofBeing in a strict phenomenological way. 
To conclude, in §2, Heidegger elaborates the question of Being in which he 
sees the Befragte is the essential clue to the answer of the question. The 
questioning of the question itself presupposes Dasein's understanding of Being. 
Structurally speaking, the question is guided by the pre-ontological understanding 
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of Being. Such an understanding of Being is not yet a conceptual grasp of 
“Being” Rather, it refers only to the ontological constitution of Dasein the 
inquirer so that the question can be asked in one way or another. We have shown 
in the above discussion that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being is 
the issue for the preparation of formulating the question ofBeing. 
C. Dasein's understanding of Being as its essential 
characteristic 
1. The preliminary indication of the meaning of Dasein 
According to the formulation of the question of Being, the Being of Dasein 
has to be revealed properly. How does Heidegger understand the meaning of 
Being of Dasein? In §4, Heidegger has given a formal indication of Dasein that 
understanding of Being is nothing other than the ontological characteristic 
[Seinsbestimmtheit] ofDasein. The famous paragraph of §4 says, 
[Dasein] is ontically distinguished by the fact that，in its very Being, 
that Being is an issue for it But in that case, this is a constitutive state 
of Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a � ‘ 
relationship towards that Being~~a relationship which itself is one of 
Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein 
understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does it so 
explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, 
this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definite 
characteristic of Dasein 's Being (Heidegger's italic) (BT 32). 
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Dasein is formally indicated as an entity that has a special relationship of 
Being [Seinsverhdltnis]. Dasein does not acquire such a relation in the way that it 
relates itself with another entity. Since Being is the Being of Dasein, Dasein has 
this relationship as long as it is. This "having" is indeed pre-ontologically 
regulated in the Being of Dasein. The kind of Being of Dasein is peculiarly 
designed as self-understanding, self-disclosing. And most essentially, disclosing 
and understanding its own Being is the ultimate issue of its own Being; Being 
remains always the issue. In German, Dasein is “in seinem Sein um sein Sein 
geht,, [SZ 12], in other words，Dasein is for the sake of its Being; Dasein 
discloses and understands its own Being for the sake of its Being~not its self s, 
but its Being's. In this sense, Dasein is always "ontological". Heidegger adds that 
Dasein's Being-ontological is not yet tantamount to its always engaging in a 
thematic inquiry on Being; this way of Being-ontological is indeed a "pre-
ontological" state ofBeing that the question ofBeing is not yet raised. 
Moreover, Dasein's being “ontological” presumes that it has an 
understanding of Being. Understanding of Being is the constitution of Dasein's 
Being-ontological. That is to say, understanding of Being and Dasein's Being-
ontological is structurally intrinsic. Dasein's Being is a determinate end ofDasein � ‘ • 
itself, as long as Dasein is, it discloses its own Being. In this sense，understanding 
of Being is always happening as long as Dasein exists. Thus，Heidegger does not 
talk about a static knowledge, or something innate to the intellect of Dasein. 
Understanding of Being is always a structurally on-going event that appropriates 
Dasein's own Being. The way of Being of Dasein, as determined so，is called 




As Dasein exists, its Being is disclosed to itself as existence. Since Being of 
Dasein is not external to it but is Dasein's very own constitution, Dasein's care 
for its own Being is not an going out for …，but a self-disclosure and self-
understanding. Heidegger also mentions that only on the basis ofcare, can Dasein 
be itself authentically. And even in its inauthentic mode ofBeing, care also lies at 
bottom to make understanding of Dasein's everyday potentiality-for-Being 
[Seinsm6glichkeit] (see BT 372 and 370). 
Sofaras Dasein has the characteristic of understanding ofBeing and its Being 
always remains the issue, it is distinguished from other entities. Not only so, 
Heidegger in Being and Time thinks that Dasein can provide the ontico-
ontological condition for the possibility of ontologies (BT 34). 
To outline the characteristic ofDasein, Heidegger makes use of two "formal 
indications" to further explicate the above description of the ontological 
characteristic of Dasein: “existence” {Existnez] and “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit]. 
Heidegger's "formally indicative method" is grounded in his early thinking of 
phenomenology/^ It is a pure "letting something be seen" or “pointing something 
out" in a pre-theoretical manner. In brief，it is a primary pointing-out of the 
phenomenon. With this "pointing-out" character, the formal indication does not 
“express” its whole phenomejnal content at once. Heidegger says，"the formal is a 
content in such a manner that the indication points into a direction, sketches out 
13 See John Van Buren, "The Ethics of Formale Anzeige in Heidegger,，，American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarter, 69 (2) Spring 1995, pp.157-170 and Theodore 
Kisiel, "The Genetic Difference in Reading Being and Time" American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarter, 69 (2) Spring 1995，pp. 171-187. 
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the way in advance”!* These indications explain the formal meaning of Dasein. 
They lay down the guiding direction to the existential constitution of Dasein so 
that the analytic can have a fixed subject. 
a. Existence 
The term "existence" [Existenz] is exclusively reserves for the kind of entity 
called Dasein. It denotes that Dasein is not a present-at-hand {Vorhanden\. It is 
stated in §9，“the ‘essence’ ofDasein lies in its ‘existence,，，(BT 67). “Existentia” 
in the scholastic terms means "actuality" [Wirklichkeit]: the "thing's being put 
out or placed outside the causes [Ursachen] which actualize it outside of nothing” 
{rei extra causa et nihilum sistentid) (BP 87). In traditional Metaphysics, 
“existentia” of Dasein, of a plant, of a stone in question is not differentiated; all 
entities are considered as present-at-hand [Vorhanden]. But the Heideggerian 
"existence" does not concern the actuality of Dasein. Rather, it only indicates the 
distinct characteristic ofDasein that it has a peculiar relationship to Being~"self-
relating and self-understanding. In this relationship to Being，Dasein has its 
possibilities to comport itself. It also has the possibilities to decide whether to “to 
be itselfor not itself (BT 33). 
Wherr Heidegger states that The "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence, 
Dasein's "essence" does not.refer to its property. The Heideggerian meaning of 
“essence，’ [Weseri] is different from the traditional scholastic “essentia”. In the 
traditional “essenticT, entity is interrogated according to its “what-ness,,, as 
“thing” that is present-at-hand. That “what” under the discussion of “essentia,, 
does not have the Dasein's kind of Being. With the word "essence" put in a 
14 Quoted from Van Buren, "The Ethics of Formale Anzeige in Heidegger", p.l65. 
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quotation mark in Being and Time, Heidegger indicates that the "essence" of 
Dasein lies in its distinctive way ofBeing~no property but its existence.^^ 
Existence signifies Dasein's ontological difference from other entities which 
Being cannot be an issue for them. For Dasein, Being is the issue and as such. 
Being is understood in the primordial phenomenon of Dasein. Existence is the 
way of Being of Dasein in which Dasein encounters the world and the entities 
within it. When Dasein is dealing and engaging with any kinds of entities, it may 
consider itself having the same kind ofBeing as they are. Indeed, in its everyday 
living (in Heidegger's terms, we shall read, “on the existentiell level") Dasein 
comports itself with the world, it can either be itself (authentically) or not itself 
(inauthentically). In this everyday way of living, Dasein has an understanding of 
itself in its Being. As simple as casually calling itself 'T' or by name, it implies 
15 According to Alfons Gxieder, the meaning of "essence" in Being and Time is not 
well elaborated. On the one hand, Heidegger sees that the traditional “essentia” is 
questionable. On the other hand he makes frequent use of 'Wesen'^  in the notion of 
“Vorgriff\ i.e. a preliminary grasp of something still in need of an ontological-
phenomenological clarification on the basis of the first part of Being and Time. 
Although Dasein's essence is determined as existence and Heidegger concerns 
himself with the analytic of what he took to be essential structures of Dasein, the 
term 'Wesen'' remains a largely indeterminate notion, (see "What did Heidegger 
mean by "Essence''? “ Alfons Grieder, pp. 65, 80-82). To a large extent, I agree 
with Grieder. Even thought the "later" Heidegger has studied and lectured heavily 
on the idea of "essence", it obviously is different from the context of the 
"fundamental ontology" ofBeing and Time. Because our focus is in Being and Time 
and in Heidegger's analytic on the question of "who" of Dasein, we shall not go 
into detail of the genealogy ofthis word. See Grieder, Alfons, "What did Heidegger 
mean by ‘Essence’？’，in Joumal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol.l9, 
No.l，January 1988, 64-89. 
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Dasein's Being-in-the-world and at the same time, it has an understanding of 
Being. This kind of self-understanding is unique in Dasein. 
b. Mineness 
The second characteristic of Dasein is “mineness，，[Jemeinigkeit]. Mineness 
is by no means "secondary" but is equi-primordial to existence. We mention 
earlier that Dasein has a self-understanding. Such a self-understanding will be 
expressed as an understanding of its own mineness一that this Dasein is in each 
case mine and no one else. Heidegger states，“that Being which is an issue for this 
entity in its very Being，is in each case mine [Das Sein ist es, darum es diessem 
Seieden in Seinem Sein geht, ist je meinesY (BT 67). In other words, Dasein is 
always Being-mine. Raffoul points out that the mineness is a "relationship of 
Being”： “In Being-mine, it is Being which is at issue. Being-mine therefore 
signifies Being itself, insofar as it is each time at issue in the entity that I am. It is 
to this extent that the existential analytic was defined on the basis of the project 
of fundamental ontology."^^ 
Raffoul reads that: “It is Being itself that is mine. And not ‘I，，then. I am 
only myself through Being.,，” It is also noteworthy that mineness is an expression 
of understanding of Being, this self-understanding discloses primordially Being, 
not the “1” Thus, we shall note that Heidegger always describes Dasein as 
“mine’，，"one's own", or “itself,. It is an important deliberation to show that 
mineness is “a way of Being of Dasein", its "Being-mine", and “Being-a-self’. It 
is different from the 'T' or the Self. 'T' or “Self, usually remain to be the 
16 Heidegger and the Subject, p. 210. 
17 Heidegger and the Subject, p.210 
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questionable phenomena or the ontical understanding of an substantial entity. 
Mineness, however, is the ground for Being-I and Being-a-Self, i.e. the Being of 
this entity. It is not the property but the Being of Dasein's I and self but the 
ontological constitution. 
To conclude, Dasein is designed as a distinctive entity. Its ontological 
difference lies, on the one hand in its having an pre-ontological understanding of 
Being; and its always having Being as an issue [um sein Sein geht] on the other. 
This ontological constitution is known as care: the disclosure of its own Being to 
itself is the ultimate end. In this sense, Dasein is always for the sake of its Being, 
and always its own potentiality-for-Being. Existence and mineness are the 
z . 
indications of Dasein exclusively. Under all this descriptions of the Being of 
Dasein, Dasein's understanding of Being is always at issue, it mark the 
ontological difference of Dasein. In the next section, we shall discuss how 
Heidegger's understanding ofDasein is very different to the traditional studies of 
man. In distancing himself from the anthropological, what Heidegger has in view 
is always whether the Being of man can be adequately questioned or revealed? Is 
the ontological difference ofDasein properly recognized? 
� 
2. The analytic of Dasein as distinguished from Anthropology 
Heidegger states, "Ontically, of course, Dasein is not only close to us~even 
that which is closest: we are it, each of us, we ourselves" (BT 36). Dasein cannot 
be a general name for a genus called human beings. Rather, it must be referring to 
an individual that “I myself am it” However, if the Dasein analytic aims at an 
“1”，it will fall back along the line of the Cartesian ego, on the level of the entity 
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present-at-hand. Now the Dasein analytic aims at explicating an entity that has a 
relationship to Being, mineness must be rendered in reference to Being ofDasein. 
Li The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger states: 
If we say "Dasein is in each case essentially mine", and if our task is to 
define this characteristic of Dasein ontologically, this does not mean we 
should investigate the essence of my self, as the factical individual, or 
of some other given individual. The object of inquiry is of mineness and 
selfhood as such (MFL 189). 
The investigation of mineness as the Being of Dasein cannot be studied as the 
substantial “self, or "individual". In Heidegger's critique, these ways of 
investigation misplace themselves on the investigation of an subject that lacks the 
quality of man. In §10, Heidegger says: 
If we posit an 'T' or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall 
completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. Ontologically, 
every idea of a “subject,，... still posits the subjectum {hypokeimenon) 
along with it, no matter how one's ontical protestations against the “soul 
substance" or the "reiflcation of consciousness". The thinghood itself � • 
which such reification implies must have its ontological origin 
demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to 
understand positively when we think of the unreifIed Being of the 
subject, the soul, the consciousness，the spirit, the person (BT 72). 
It is clear from the above quotation that mineness cannot be treated as an subject. 
Otherwise, it will be reified as a thing. Heidegger thinks that there are two 
important elements in this traditional anthropology: Man as a zoon logon echon, 
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and as an ens creatum, This two sources only indicate that “over and above the 
attempt to determine the essence of ‘man, as an entity, the question ofBeing has 
remained forgotten, and this Being is rather conceived as something present-at-
hand of the other created things" (BT 75). Heidegger criticizes the 
anthropological orientation arising from the Greek and Christian tradition as an 
obstacle to the question ofDasein's Being as follow:^^ 
0. Being can neither be determined by the composition of animal and ratio, nor 
that of ens Jlnitum and its special relation to God 
Traditional anthropology defines man as the z6on logon echon. It means 
"rational animal". The “logos,, is understood to be some kind of "superior 
endowment" [h6lere Ausstattung] to the human soul. Likewise, in the definition 
of man as "a creation in the likeness and image of God", man is defined as 
“something that reaches beyond himself, (BT 74). God's spirit endows this ens 
finitum. Both of these definitions of man define man as a compound of a bodily 
element and a psychical (spiritual) element. However, it is impossible to 
determine Being as a collection of parts. Heidegger said, “When however, we 
come to the question of man's Being, this is not something we can simply 
compute [errechnet\ by adding together those kinds of Being which body, soul, � 
and spirit respectively possess~kinds of Being whose nature has not as yet been 
determined" (BT 73-74). Heidegger says, “It must face the whole man" (ibid.F. 
The metaphysical inquiries toward the substance of soul, spirit or the like, are not 
directed toward the question of Being as Being. The Being that belongs to man 
remains obscure in the terms rational animale and ens fmitum. 
18 See Heidegger and the Subject, pp.27-32. 
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b, The indetemtinacy of Logos 
The traditional anthropology defines man as “zdon logon echon”. Man is 
interpreted as animal rationale, "something living which has reason" (BT 208). 
According to the analysis in What is a Thing?, considering and expressing 
something as something in Latin is “reor,, or “ratio”. Therefore, ratio becomes 
the translation of logos. What is expressed as ratio, is understood as assertion or 
judgement (BT 55-56). Ratio is then translated into English "reason" (or 
“Vernunff, in German) and is understood as the guideline for determining 
something as something,�Li this manner. Ratio is interpreted as a faculty of 
judgement which is an essential property of man. Heidegger criticizes that this 
translation overlooks the original meaning of logos as “discourse” (see BT 55 and 
WT 64). Heidegger criticizes that taking logos to be ratio “is not ‘false,，but it 
covers up the phenomenal basis for this definition of ‘Dasein，” (BT 208-9). 
Tracing the meaning of logos back into the Greeks' usage, Heidegger finds that 
its original signification is related to “kgein”, means "discourse". So, the 
phenomenal content of man (Dasein) as zoon logon echon is shown to be “that 
living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for 
discourse" (BT 47). The ability to talk is not considered as one capacity among 
the other. Heidegger sees that discourse is an ontological problem ofDasein. 
'^ See also HCT 154. 
20 See WT 64, "The basic form ofthinking, and thus of thought, is the guideline for 
the determination of the thingness of the thing. The categories determine in general 
the being of what is...It remains essential that thought as simple assertion, logos, 
ratio, is the guideline for the determination of the Being of what is，i.e. for the 
thingness of thing. The term "Guideline" [Leitfaden] means that the modes of 
asserting direct the view in the determining of the presence [Anwesenheit], i.e. the 
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Heidegger explicates that discourse means apophainesthai: so far as a 
discourse is genuine, it lets the very thing that is talked about be seen both by the 
speaker and the hearers (BT 56). Because Dasein is considered as a Being-in-the-
world, its way of "letting something be seen" is distinct from that within a 
subject-object relation. Discourse implies the structure of communication: it 
implies the existential structure ofDasein,s Being-with-one-another-ness. Dasein 
is in discourse always implies that the others are there with it. The common 
practices determine the grammatical rules, so long as Dasein follows these rules, 
that which is talked about can be make known to the others. Only with regards to 
the structure of Being-in-the-world, the function of apophainesthai can be 
fulfilled.2i 
The discovery of logos as discourse is important in Heideggerian studies. 
We shall not go into the details of his discussion of logos. For the purpose of 
discussion here, we shall conclude that Heidegger reject the Latin translation of 
zoon logon echon into animal rationale. Only if logos is referred back to its 
original meaning as discourse, can the phenomenal content of the Greeks 
definition of man can be explicated and can Dasein be disclosed as a Being-in-
the-world. 
� ‘ 
being of what is". 
21 For further discussion of the function of logos as apophainesthai, see F. von 
Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phanomenologie des Daseins: Eine Erlduterung von 
“Sein und Ziet", Band I Einleitung die Exposition der Farge nach dem Sinn von 
Sein, Frankurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987，pp.316-334. 
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c, The essence of man lies in its existence or humanitas 
The understanding of man as zoon logon echon is also criticized for taking 
man as a kind of animal. We may make a limited reference to the "later" 
Heideggerian critique to anthropology. In Letter on Humanism, Heidegger 
contrasts animal rationale with homo humanitas. The most essential investigation 
of man is，"whether the essence of man primordially and most decisively lies in 
the dimension of animalitas at all" (BW 227). And as a rational animal, despite 
his possession of ratio, man shares the same animality with other organism. That 
defines man in terms of an organism comparing to beast and plants. Heidegger 
says: 
Man can be conceived as an organism, and has been so conceived for a 
long time. Man so conceived is ranked with plants and animals, 
regardless of whether we assume that rank order to show an evolution, 
or classify the genera of organisms in some other way. Even when man 
is marked out as the rational living entity, he is still been seen in a way 
in which his character as an organism remains decisive ... All 
anthropology continues to be dominated by the idea that man is an 
organism. Philosophical anthropology as well as scientific anthropology � ‘ 
will not use man's essential nature as the starting point for their 
definition ofman" (Heidegger's italic WCT 148). 
Heidegger criticizes that the traditional metaphysical understanding of man 
only thinks on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his 
humanitas (BW 227). “If we are to think of man as not an organism 
[Lebenwesen] but a human being [Menschenweseny Heidegger says，‘‘we must 
first give attention to the fact that man is that entity who has his Being by 
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pointing to what is，and that particular entities manifest themselves as such by 
such pointing" (WCT 148-149). According to §7 of Being and Time, pointing out 
something and let this something be seen is the function of logos (see BT 56). 
Once again, the investigation into the essential character of man demands an 
understanding of logos. By pointing something out, what is primordially pointed 
out is the Being of the talked about. Making manifest of the Being of entities is 
interpreted as the understanding of Being [Seinsverstdndnis] in Being and Time 
whereas in Letter on Humanism, it is called Dasein's openness to Being. 
Grounded in Dasein's understanding ofBeing, Dasein points out the Being of 
other entities. In other words, Dasein determines the presence or "being-within-
the-world-ness" of the other entities. In terms of Being and Time and Heidegger's 
lectures in the 20's, this relatedness ofDasein to the intra-worldly beings is called 
“letting-be” {Seinlassen]. Dasein points out the Being of them and in so pointing, 
it also relates itself to its own Being. Therefore, the explication of the humanitas 
of man involves an ontological explication of the relatedness of Dasein to other 
entities, to its own Being, and to Being in general. This relatedness lies in 
Dasein's existence. 
"Existence" is a distinct characteristic of Being that is solely designated to 
the entities called Dasein. It is a "human way ‘to be，” (BW 228). Accordingly to 
this meaning, animals and plants “are” but they do not “exist” Existence does not 
belong to a specific kind of living creature among others—granted that man is 
destined to have Being as its issue for itself (see BT 67). The approach of the 
* 
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animalitas covers up the essential humanitas of man; it levels up the 
distinctiveness of being human^ ^ 
Therefore, the inquiry of Dasein's Being into its mineness cannot be 
undertaken as anthropology does. In Being and Time, Heidegger indeed abandons 
the usage of the term "man" to avoid confusion. 
D. The question ofwho ofDasein 
The Dasein analytic is now confirmed to be the access to the question of 
Being. Hence it is regulated by the question ofBeing. The analytic，thus, aims at 
a "proper explication of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being" (BT 27). 
Then the question is: how can “the right way of access to” Dasein be obtained? In 
the last section, we have discussed the ontological determination of Dasein as 
"existence" and "mineness". However, they are only “formal indications" which 
are to be further explicated. 
As we have discussed in the previous section, Dasein is traditionally taken to 
be present-at-hand. In Being and Time, explicating the Being of Dasein is at the 
same t ime� t a sk bf differentiating the Being of Dasein and the Being of present-
at-hand. Heidegger writes, 
22 Heidegger has gone so far as saying, “the human body is something essentially 
other than an animal organism" (BW 228). Discussion of the organic, physical 
dispersion of human beings is always excluded from the ontological analytic. 
Another example of this tendency is Heidegger's discussion on "the hand" in his 
latter writings. See Jacques Derrida, “La main de Heidegger" in Psyche: Inventions 
de l'autre, Paris: Galilee, 1987，pp.415-451. 
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All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by 
considering Dasein's existential structure. Because Dasein's characters 
of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them 
“existentialia”. These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call 
"categories"~characteristics of Being for entities whose character is 
not that ofDasein (BT 70). 
Also in the same paragraph, he continues: 
Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters 
of Being. The entities which correspond to them require different kind 
of primary interrogation respectively: any entity is either a "wAo" 
(existence) or a “what,, (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense) (BT 
71). 
"Whatness" asks about the essence [essentia and ousia] of a thing that is a given 
present-at-hand. Li the traditional sense, the “who’，question also asks about the 
individuality of the “given’，subject. Though this subject may have a certain kind 
of personality as well. The two questions are directed to a quid of present-at-
hand. 
� -
In contrast to the present-at-hand, the explication of the existentiality of 
Dasein has to be interrogated by a new sense of whoness. In The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology, Heidegger also says, "we gain access to this entity only if we 
ask: Who is it?” He stresses, "Dasein is not constituted by whatness but“if we 
may coin the whoness,, (BP 120). Heidegger says，"No doubt we do ask such a 
question. But this only shows that this what, with which we also ask about the 
nature of the who, obviously cannot coincide with the what in the sense of 
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whatness" (BP 120). In Heidegger's discussion of the specific way of posing the 
who-question, we see that he is aware of the tendency of questioning its whoness 
in terms of the whatness of things. Such a tendency is explained in Dasein's 
structure ofBeing-in-the-world. By doing so, the “whoness” ofDasein which can 
be taken as a present-at-hand is also included in this structure. Then, the question 
of the who ofDasein is not driven to an I-thing or person-thing. Rather, what is at 
issue is Dasein's way of Being as Being-in-the-world. That “who，，which is in 
question will be rendered no more than a “way ofBeing” (BT 153). Heidegger 
points out that this tendency is rooted in Dasein's Being. He states: 
The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in 
understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms ofthat 
entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is 
essentially constant~in terms of the world (BT 36). 
The tendency of comporting itself towards the kind of entity that is not itself 
creates the hermeneutical difficulty for gaining the access to Dasein. Li other 
words, the access to the question of the Being of Dasein is difficult to attain 
because Dasein's Being still remains concealed. The way of Being that Dasein 
tends to comport itself to the world is called everydayness [Alltalichkeit]; this 
everyday way of existence is- called "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit]. In this 
way of Being，Dasein is proximally and for the most part “indifferent” to its 
ontological distinction. In addition, it is indeed "undifferentiated" from the 
present-at-hand [Vorhanden]. 
Re-establishing the ontological difference of Dasein is the main task of 
Being and Time. Hence, it aims at differentiating Dasein from the present-at-
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hand. In Being and Time, the sentences like，“Dasein does not have the kind of 
Being which belongs to present-at-hand [Vorhanden] within the world, nor does 
it ever have it’，(BT 68) appear repeatedly. We shall find that rendering this 
differentiation does not mean to differentiate them conceptually. However, the 
tendency of understanding itself as a present-at-hand is indeed an explanation of 
/ 
the structure of this tendency. This tendency is the ‘‘facticity” of Dasein as its 
way of Being as a Being-in-the-world. Heidegger says, 
But the fact that “Dasein” can be taken as something which is present-
at-hand and just present-at-hand, is not to be confused with a certain 
way of "presence-at-hand" which is Dasein's own (BT 82). 
The way that Dasein comports itself to the present-at-hand is regarded to be 
the structure of Dasein's existence. It involves explaining Dasein as a Being-in-
the-world and describes Dasein's tendency to understand itself as a present-at-
hand. The explication of this tendency must not be confused with the facticity of 
Dasein, the intraworldliness of the entities ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand. 
We shall see that present-at-hand is treated only as a theoretical object that is 
based on the insufficient understanding of the phenomenon ofthe world. 
� ‘ 
The question of “what” is demonstrated as an ingenuine question of the 
Being of the intraworldly thing. In this question, a “thing” emerges as the 
theoretical present-at-hand. In Being and Time, Heidegger explains that the 
Being-present-at-hand-ness is not the primary state of Being that an entity shows 
itself in itself to Dasein. Opposing to the theoretical objectification of things, 
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Heidegger raises the primacy ofpraxis^^ Since Dasein is a Being-in-the-world, it 
always encounters entities within this ontological constitution. Entities are 
encountered in Dasein's concemful dealings [besoregen Umgang]. Heidegger 
appropriates Dasein's "concemful dealings” to the Greek praxis and the thing 
that is so encountered as pragmata—equipment {Zeug] (BT 96-97). Heidegger 
explains that things such as ink, paper, table, lamp “never show themselves 
proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill 
up a room" (BT 98). We encounter the room as an equipment for residing. In the 
context of the room，the “arrangement” emerges and within which the 
"individual" item of equipment shows itself. Namely, before the individual 
equipment shows itself, the totality of equipment has already been disclosed. 
Furthermore, Heidegger says, "Equipment can genuinely show itself only in 
dealings cut to its own measure (hammering with a hammer, for example); but in 
such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring 
thing, nor is the equipment-structure known as such even in the using" (BT 98). 
He regards the hammering does not simply have knowledge about [um\ the 
hammer's character as equipment. It has only appropriated this equipment in a 
way which could not possibly be more suitable. In such dealings, Heidegger � ‘ 
explains that our concem subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" [Um-zu\ which is 
constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time. 
23 See BT 97-99 and BP §llb. For further discussion of praxis in the Heideggerian 
thinking, see also Heidegger's Plato 's Sophist, §5. Praxis is interpreted as modes of 
Aletheueiri', Franco Volpi, "Dasein as praxis: the Heideggerian assimilation and 
radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle", Critical Heidegger, 
Christopher Macann ed., London: Routledge, 1996, pp.27-66. 
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Theoretical consideration does not apply in such dealing. On the contrary, 
"the less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and 
use it, the more primordial does our relation to it become, and the more 
unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment" (BT 98). 
Heidegger thinks that this is the primary state that the equipment shows itself in 
itself to Dasein. The kind of Being of equipment is called "readiness-to-hand" 
{Zuhandenheit[. 
‘ By this token, the theoretical thing (present-at-hand) emerges only as 
secondary. We have already quoted form Heidegger that “ 'things' never shows 
themselves proximally as they are for themselves" (BT 97-98). Heidegger says, 
“ifwe look at things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding 
readiness-to-hand" (BT 98). But only ready-to-hand has the 'Being-in-itself in 
its self-showing as itself. Therefore, the theoretical "staring" on the thing does not 
grasp the genuine phenomenal content ofthe entity that is being encountered by 
Dasein. Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in the equipment only to 
withdraw to the readiness-to-hand with which one concerns oneself (BT 103). In 
other words, only when an equipment is missing, inusable or misplaced, and it 
becomes an "un-ready-to-hand" would it emerge as a present-at-hand. � ‘ 
Accordingly, the Being of the present-at-hand-ness of thing demands a 
clarification ofDasein's Being beforehand. The relationship between present-at-
hand and Dasein is notjust a theoretical opposition. Rather, the Being ofpresent-
at-hand has an ontological constitutive relationship to Dasein's existence as a 
Being-in-the-world. 
The question of "what" is not suitable for an explication of the primary way 
of Being of Dasein. Furthermore, since Dasein is an entity that is “in each case 
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mine" and the answer to the who-question is no more than “I am it". Heidegger's 
question does not ask about the “1” thing but Dasein's I-saying. Saying 'T' is 
primarily a way of self-expression in our everyday mode of Being. Likewise, 
being 'T' is also treated as a way of Being but not a certitude. In addition, being 
an “ r is a way of Being of Dasein in its everyday pre-theoretical life. This way 
of Being is called Being-in-the-world. Only in rendering Dasein as a Being-in-
the-world, can the whole phenomenon of saying 'T' and the tendency that takes 
itself as a present-at-hand can be exhibited. In this sense, the question of"who" is 
not questioning on a "what" {res cogitans, soul, or substance) of Dasein, but the 
way ofBeing of its Being-in-the-world. 
£. Conclusion 
In the above discussion, we have shown that the question of Being is 
structurally determined to start with the Dasein analytic. It is due to the circular 
structure of the question. It is because the question of Being has to be guided by 
an "understanding ofBeing" [Se insverstdndn /5] ofDasein. Such an understanding 
is indeed Dasein's relationship-to-Being [Seinsverhdltnis]. It is an ontological 
structure ofDasein. As long as Dasein exists, it has an understanding ofBeing. In 
addition, understanding of Being refers to another structure of Dasein~Being is 
an issue of Dasein. In this stage of discussion, we shall provisionally understand 
this regulation of Being of Dasein in terms of two formal indications: existence 
[Existenz] and mineness [Jemeinighkeit]. 
Questioning the Being ofDasein is indeed different from the traditional ways. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes Dasein analytic from anthropology. 
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The question whether Dasein is a creation of God, or how Dasein is different 
from another animal with its endowment of reason [logos] is not the point of the 
Dasein analytic. Heidegger criticizes that the traditional ways of studying the 
Being of man in terms of I, subject, soul or spirit fail “to see the need for 
inquiring about the Being" of Dasein (BT 72). Indeed, Heidegger criticizes that 
- the neglect of the question of the Being of Dasein is at the same time a passing 
over of the ontological distinction of Dasein. He points out that either taking 
Dasein as substance, or I，soul or person is a reification ofDasein，i.e.，taking 
Dasein as a thing present-at-hand. 
Heidegger thinks that the omission of the question of Being is not only a 
matter of not seeing a property of the Dasein. However, Being is not just a 
property of Dasein. Rather, it is the determination ofDasein as an entity that it is 
(BT 25). Namely，omission of the question ofBeing ofDasein is in fact a failure 
of determining Dasein in its essence. Since Dasein is determined as an existent 
that its way of Being is determined as something possesses understanding of 
Being and is in each case mine. Thus, omission of the question of Being of 
Dasein is the root of inadequately regarding Dasein a present-at-hand. Hence, one 
task of the Dasein analytic, with Dasein's Being in view, in contrast with the � 
traditional failure, is to reappropriate,the ontological difference ofDasein. 
Likewise, assigning the who-question as the sole way of questioning the 
Being of Dasein is also a move to differentiate Dasein from present-at-hand. That 
Heidegger creates the new meaning of ‘‘whoness’，as a point of departure for a 
• , 
new horizon of posing the question of the Being of Dasein in which the ‘T，is 
considered as the phenomenon of I-saying. In the next chapter, we shall discuss 
how Heidegger contrasts the new interpretation of whoness with Descartes' 
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cogito sum. He thinks that Descartes has rightly declared the first modem 
unshakable truth. Heidegger says, "historiologically, the aim of the existential 
analytic can be made plainer by considering Descartes, ... by his ‘cogito sum,,, 
(BT 71-72). However, Descartes is renounced for not having determined the 
Being of the sum and is absorbed in the investigations into the res cogitans. Kant, 
however, is recognized as the one who has retrieved the phenomenal content ofI-
saying to the “I think". However, Heidegger thinks that Kant also fails to locate 
the question of Being of the subject. He only presumes both the I and the things 
outside of me are all present-at-hand. Ln this sense, Heidegger thinks that Kant 
has not followed strictly enough in the way of explicating the phenomenon of 
Dasein's I-saying. It is because, he thinks, every “I think" must be thought as “I 
think something". The "something" is not only representation present-at-hand, 
but it has an ontological relationship with the I in the phenomenon of Being-in-
the-world. Thus, as a Being-in-the-world, in any saying “I am”，Dasein expresses 
“I am in the world". The “I am" as the most immediate answer to the who-






Confronting Descartes，and Kant's “I am，， 
Retrieving the phenomenon ofsaying T: from “/ am" to "l-am-
in-the-world" 
A. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we have discussed that the Dasein analytic is undertaken 
as the point of departure toward the question ofBeing in Being and Time. Also, it 
is the question of"who" that is one ofthe guiding problematic to Dasein analytic. 
The who-question ofDasein aims at clarifying the ontological difference between 
Dasein and present-at-hand. Thus, Dasein cannot be interrogated in terms of a 
"what". The setting of the who-question is also regulated by its ontological 
motive: clarifying the meaning of the Being of Dasein. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger states, “The Being of entities ‘is, not itself an entity. If we are to 
understand the problem ofBeing, our first step consists in ...not defining entities 
as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if Being 
had the character of some possible entity" (BT 26). 
In this chapter, we shall discuss how Heidegger has rejected the traditional 
understanding of the answer to the question, “I am this Dasein". In common 
sense, the content of this expression is utterly simple: it stands for me and nothing 
further (see BT 366). The obviousness of the content of the expression “I am this 
Dasein" seems to be given immediately. According to this ordinary 
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understanding, if the who-question is to carried out in a theoretical manner, the I 
is always seen as some kind of subject Heidegger says: 
If we posit an “1” or subject as that which is proximally given, we shall 
completely miss the phenomenal content of Dasein. Ontologically, 
every idea of a "subject" ... still posits the subjectum {hypokeimenon) 
along with it, no matter how one's ontical protestations against the “soul 
substance" or the ‘‘reification of consciousness". The thinghood itself 
which such reification implies must have its ontological origin 
demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to 
understand positively when we think of the unreified Being of the 
subject, the soul, the consciousness, the spirit, the person (BT 72). 
Dasein is not a thing. Its Being is "defined" as something that Being is always an 
issue for it. Also if Heidegger's who-question is a question about the Being of 
Dasein, its mineness, it cannot start from the I as a subject. For it will only lead to 
an ontical explanation of the I into another kind of entity. The Being of the “1” 
thus, is the issue. But how does Heidegger start questioning the who-question 
without a determined point ofdeparture from the I? 
� 
The point of departure of Heidegger's answering the who-question is the 
phenomenon of I-saying; it is a mode of Being of Dasein. Heidegger regards 
Descartes the one who manifests the ultimate ground of saying “1” by declaring 
“ego sum, ego existd,—“I am, I exist". He thinks that the Cartesian sum would 
have raised the question of Being of the “1”. Thus, the Cartesian “cogito sum,’ 
(BT 71-72)，if its Being is sufficiently considered as a problem, it can be the 
ontological access to the phenomenon of the “I am” However, Descartes fails to 
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see the sum a problem. The ontological insight of the sum subsides right after it is 
declared beneath the res cogitans~the question of whatness. 
Heidegger thinks that if the phenomenon of saying 'T' is to be explicated, the 
Cartesian cogito sum has to be reversed to be sum cogito (BT 254). The meaning 
ofthe sum is also revised notjust as “I am", but “I am in the world,，(HCT 216). 
Heidegger's studies on the Kantian “I think" paves the road to converting the “I 
am" into ‘‘I am in the world" (BT §64). He thinks that only through such a 
conversion, can the phenomenon be full explicated. 
B. The Criticism on the Cartesian Ego 
Heidegger says: 
Historiologically, the aim of the existential analytic can be made 
plainer by considering Descartes, who is credited with providing the 
point of departure for modem philosophical inquiry by his discovery of 
the “cogito sim”. He investigates the “cogitare” of the “ego，，，at least 
within certain limits. On the other hand, he leaves the sum completely 
undisctissed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial as than the 
cogito. Our analytic raises the ontological question of the Being of the 
sum (BT 71-72). 
As early as 1921, Heidegger has undertaken the confrontation with 
Descartes. In the course "Aristotle Introduction",^^ Jean-Luc Marion points that 
24 Heidegger's 1921-22 Freiburg Lecture ''Phdnomenologische Interpretationen zu 
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out Heidegger's interest in Descartes never subsides from the beginning of his 
career right up to the end. Lti the mind of young Heidegger, Descartes poses the 
question ofBeing by giving privilege to the sum as the first certitude. In Marion's 
view, Heidegger believes that Descartes has raised a powerful question ofBeing， 
upon the meaning of the “am” Heidegger says, "The weight of the question is 
placed immediately, without any motive and following the traditional standpoint, 
upon the ‘I，，whereby the meaning of the T remains essentially undetermined, 
instead [being placed] upon the meaning of the ‘I think, of the 'am."'^^ 
Giving the priority to the question of the sum can, for Heidegger, be a new 
beginning for ontology. Heidegger thinks that the sum or “I am" is indeed the 
“real philosophical problem" (BT 71) and that Descartes fails to grasp, ln the 
Mediationes, Descartes moves right on from the sum to ask "What this 'F is?"^^ 
Thus, the metaphysical tendency takes over the ontological insight and surpasses 
the question ofBeing. Therefore, Heidegger says, 
If the “cogito sum,, is to serve as the point of departure for the 
existential analytic of Dasein，then it needs to be turned around, and 
furthermore, its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal 
confirmation. The “sim,, is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense 
Aristoteles: Einfurung in die phdnomenologische Forschung”. The material of 
discussion on this lecture is based on Jean-Luc Marion's citations in his Reduction 
andGivenmss, Chapter 3. 
25 Quoted from Reduction and Givenness, p. 78 (it is originally in the Privatdozent, 
GA6l,Anhangl,^M2). 
26 Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham, New 
York: Press Syndicate ofthe University ofCambridge: 1993, 17-18. This book will 
be referred as “Meditations” here in this thesis. 
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that “I am in a world". As such an entity, “I am: in the possibility of 
Being towards various ways of comporting myself—namely, 
cogitationes~as ways of Being alongside entities within-the-world. 
Descartes, on the contrary, says that cogitationes are present-at-hand, 
and that in these an ego is present-at-hand too as a worldless res 
cogitans (BT 254); 
It is not cogito sum which formulates a primary finding but rather sum 
cogito. And this sum is not taken in the ontological indifference in 
which Descartes and his successors took it, as the extantness of a 
thinking thing. Sum here is the assertion of the basic constitution ofmy 
Being: I-am-in-a-world and therefore I am capable of thinking it (HCT 
216). 
The “tuming around" of the “cogito sum,, signifies Heidegger's opposition of 
Descartes. With regard to the ontological distinctiveness ofDasein as an existent, 
Dasein cannot be defmed as the res cogito that is present-at-hand. Moreover， 
Heidegger also renews the phenomenal content of the items: the “swn,, does not 
signify an undifferentiated “is,，of Dasein. Rather, ontological difference is 
stressed if a Dasein “is,，，it is not a present-at-hand that occurs. Instead, it always 
signifies Dasein “is” a "Being-in-the-world". And that it is a "who". Accordingly, 
the “cogitation” means comportment~the ways of Being-in in the world of 
Dasein. 
The task of the Dasein analytic is to make the Being of Dasein, the sum, 
transparent. However, Descartes is always criticized with regard to his omission 
of the determination of the meaning of sum. He criticizes that, 
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With the ‘‘cogito sum” Descartes had claimed that he was putting 
philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined 
when he began in this “radical” way, was the kind of the meaning of 
Being ofthe "sum，，(BT 46). 
The Cartesian cogito has covered up the ontological meaning of the “swn”. Thus, 
the ontological foundations of the “cogito sum,, is omitted and Descartes "failed 
to provide an ontology of Dasein" (BT 46). Heidegger's criticism on the 
indeterminacy of the sum in Descartes philosophy can be discussed in two points: 
(1) the indeterminacy of the sum; and (2) the indeterminacy of substantiality. 
1. Indeterminacy of the sum 
Heidegger sees that the tendency of the ontological omission is based on the 
move that Descartes determines the Ego as certitude. In the Second Meditation, 
Descartes said, “... I must fmally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever its is put forward by me or conceived in my mind，，?？ 
Descartes thinks that "a sufficient understanding of what is this T is，that now 
necessarily exists", means to determine it by “res cogitans”:^ The res cogitans � -
is determined as something that has consciousness [cogitationes], However, 
Heidegger thinks that consciousness and representation are not sufficient to 
reveal the Being of this res. He points out that the “res” is only understood as a 
"something" (BT 126). In this sense, Heidegger deems Descartes and his • « 
27 Meditations, p. 17. 
^^Meditations, p.l8. 
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decedents surpass the question ofBeing. Also，Dasein's Being is leveled down to 
equal to other entities, its ontological difference of neglected. In this sense, 
Heidegger fmds the Cartesian thinking of cogito sum unsatisfying. He says， 
“[Descartes] investigates the cogitare, at least within certain limits. On the other 
hand, he leaves the ‘sum, completely undiscussed, even thought it is regarded as 
no primordial than the cogito,, (BT 71). 
Heidegger thinks that Descartes' neglect of the meaning of Being is rooted 
in the Ancient and Christian ontology. Defining the ego as res, Descartes thinks 
that the res cogitans is ontologically an ens creatum. This thesis refers back to the 
medieval Christian ontology (see BT 46). The determination ofBeing of entities 
are rooted in the distinction between God, “ens infinitum” and “ens increatum”. 
The distinction ofthe entities according to their "createdness" [Geschaffenheit] in 
the widest sense of having been produced [Hergestelltheit]^^ was an essential 
theme ofthe ancient conception ofBeing. Heidegger says: 
the seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for 
philosophizing has revealed itself as the implantation of the baleful 
prejudice, which has kept later generations from making any thematic 
ontological analytic of the “mind” [Gemutes] such as would take the 
question of Being as a clue and would at the same time come to grips 
critically with the traditional ancient ontology (BT 46). 
The distinction ofthe infinite entity (God) and the finite entity {res cogitans and 
res extensa) according to their createdness means: 
29SeeBP§llb. 
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All entities other than God need to be "produced" in the widest sense 
and also to be sustained. "Being" is to be understood within a horizon 
which ranges from the production of what is present-at-hand to 
something which has no need being produced. (BT 125). 
Thus, the Cartesian “sim” that is determined as the Being of a res according to its 
createdness, tums out to determine the Being of the ego according to another 
entity. This way of questioning in fact fails to see the difference between Being 
and entities. The question ofBeing has not yet been correctly posed. 
Moreover, both the res cogitans and the res croporea are expressed by the 
term “existence” Their differences are only distinguished by their ranking in 
their createdness. The question of difference is set on the comparison of 
"thinking" with “extension”，By this token，the ontological difference of ego 
(Dasein) from the present-at-hand is also omitted. The existence of the ego is 
expressed as the same as the existence of the present-at-hand. They are all 
expressed as '"res"\ Thus, Heidegger criticizes that Descartes is indifferent to the 
ontological difference (HCT 216). Marion adds, “The certitude of the ego cogito 
therefore does not abolish the indetermination in it of the sum and of the esse but 
rather reinforced that indetermination".^® Dasein's way of Being then become 
leveled off as the one among the present-at-hand. Dasein's characteristic of 
existence and mineness are missed completely. Therefore, the indetermination of 
the sum is the main criticism that Heidegger makes on Descartes. In this sense，he 
says, "If the "cogito sum, is to serve as the point of departure for the existential 
30 Reduction and Givenness, p.88. 
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analytic ofDasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore, its content 
needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation" (BT 254). 
2. hidetermmacy of substantiality 
The formulation ofDescartes, idea oires cogitans goes back to the medieval 
ontology. The meaning of Being has always referred to "substance". However, 
\ 
the meaning of "substance" is used ambiguously in this tradition. It is used to 
express "Being" in two different manners: 
On the one hand, it sometimes is an ontological determination. Descartes 
says, “by substance, we can understand nothing else than an entity which is in 
such a way that it needs no other entity in order to be,, (BT 125).^ ^ The Being ofa 
substance is determined by its independence of other entities in order to be. This 
meaning of substantiality has to be conceived through the idea of "God". Here 
“God” is an “purely ontological term" (BT 125) for the ens perfectissimum. 
Furthermore, “God，，is also a self-evident concept that is designed to sustain the 
differentiation ofentities by their producedness. Thus, God is distinctive from the 
creation. Also, within the realm of created entity, man is distinctive from the res � 
extensa (nature, the world) because man is relatively that which is in no need of 
‘ . ‘ 
other entity. The res cogitans is therefore a substance. 
On the other hand, “substance” is used in the ontical senses: that God, man 
and res extensa “are，，substances. However, there is an infinite difference among 
the substantiality of them. Thus, the word “is，’ cannot be meant to apply to these 
31 Heidegger's citation from Principia Philosophiae, I, pr.51. 
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entities in the same sense. The medieval ontological problem is based on this 
multiplicity of the meaning of Being. The Schoolmen problematize the issue in 
the positive side: to achieve an imivocal signification of the word “Being,，. 
However, Heidegger thinks that Descartes "evades" the ontological problem 
altogether. He points out that Descartes “failed to discuss the meaning of Being 
which the idea of substantiality embraces, or the 'universality' which belongs to 
this signification" (BT 126). 
Descartes emphasizes that substance as such~that is to say，substantiality~is 
in and for itself inaccessible. He thinks that Being itself does not affect us, and 
therefore cannot be perceived (BT 126).^^Because Being is not accessible as an 
entity, it is expressed through attributes. In Principia Philosophiae, Descartes 
said that substance cannot be first discovered merely from the fact that it is a 
thing that exist. “We may, however, easily discover it by means of any one of its 
attributes because it is a common notion that nothing is possessed of no attribute， 
properties, or qualities".^^ Therefore, the substantiality can be grasped by the 
attribute but not by it Being. 
Heidegger considers Descartes' investigations a study of the attributes of 
different substances. For example, the ontological ground for the “world” is 
defined as res extensa, i.e. Being of res extensa is not only left unclarified, but its 
clarification is thought to be impossible. In tum, Being is represented by way of 
whatever substantial property that pertains to it. Heidegger thinks that this way of 
defining the characteristic of a substance is based on the fact that the ontological 
32 Heidegger's citation from Principia Philosophiae, I, pr.51. 
33 Principia Philosophiae, I’ pr.52. 
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and ontical function of the word "substantiality" is left unclarified. He thinks that 
the Cartesian ambiguity is due to the "failure to master the basic problem of 
Being" (BT 127). Descartes dose not see the difference between substantiality 
(Being) and substance (entity). 
C. The Criticism on the Kantian Cogito 
The answer to the question of "who" of Dasein is “I am it". Descartes 
demonstrates the traditional tendency of determining the 'T' as a thing, i.e. the res 
cogitans. This ‘T，also always "stands for me and nothing further" (BT 366). 
Likewise, this 'T' is regarded as something simple. It is not an attribute of other 
things; in other words, it is not itself a predicate but the "subject". This 'T' as the 
"subject" is also grasped as a “unity of body, soul and spirit" (BT 366，73-74). It 
is rooted in the Greek ontology. In the Modem philosophy, starting from the 
Cartesian ego as the first indubitable truth, the “1” gains its place as the absolute 
“subject，，that is distinct from other entities. The T ' , the "human subjectivity" 
becomes the center of thought in the Modem Philosophy.^^ Heidegger says: 
It will be expected that ontology now takes the subject as exemplary � 
entity and interprets the concept of Being by looking to the mode of 
Being of the subject~that henceforth the subject's way of Being 
becomes an ontological problem. But that is precisely what does not 
happen (BP 123). 
34 See WT 98-99 and BP 123. 
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In the above discussion on Heidegger's criticism on the indeterminacy of the 
Cartesian sum, we have seen that the problem ofBeing of the ego is omitted; and 
that the ego is only grasped ontically as a thing. In his criticism of this tradition, 
Heidegger thinks that Kant is the unique thinker that conforms strictly with the 
phenomenal content given in the I-saying and does not fall prey to the traditional 
way of determining the ego. The Paralogism of Pure Reason is a unique 
breakthrough from the tradition that sees the "impossibility of ontically reducing 
the T to a substance" (BT 367). However, Kant has only rejected a wrong ontical 
explanation of the 1. Kant has not yet achieved an ontological Interpretation of 
Selfhood, nor has he even obtained some assurance of it and made positive 
preparation for it. 
Moreover, Heidegger says: 
Kant makes a more rigorous attempt than his predecessors to keep hold 
of the phenomenal content of saying “1”； yet even though in theory he 
has denied that the ontical foundations of the ontology of the substantial 
apply to the “1”，he still slips back into this same inappropriate ontology 
(BT 366). 
� 
Kant's slipping back to the tradition of taking the ego as a substance is rooted 
in his understanding of this ego as an “I bind together". "In each taking-together 
or relating, the T always underlies—the hypokeimenon' (BT 367). In this 
treatment, Kant interprets the “1” as a consciousness, “I think", that is not a 
representation but the "form" of representation in general. The “1” is determined 
as the ‘‘logical subject". Heidegger said, “this T，，is “subject again". (BT 367). 
But the primary determination of the subject in the sense of the hypokeimenon is 
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suppressed in self-consciousness, or in self-conceiving. Heidegger points out that 
“it was already no longer a specific ontological problem but was among things 
taken for granted as evident" (BP 152-3), Not only the question of Being is 
omitted but the ontological difference is also concealed. Therefore the 
determination ofthe “1，，as the "logical 1” is in fact "ontologically inappropriate" 
(BT 367). 
However, Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is our only concem here in this 
thesis, so we shall not go into Kant's project of Transcendental Logic. We shall 
only focus on Heidegger's critique on Kant in BT §64 and §43b. In these two 
paragraphs, we do not go into the detail of the full elucidation of Heidegger's 
criticism on the Kantian ego. The issue cannot be completed without a study on � 
the Kantian moral person. We do not attempt to answer why Heidegger thinks 
that Kant determines ego again as a finite subject. Our discussion only ends at the 
demonstration ofthe insufficiency ofthe Kantian “I think" as an omission ofthe 
phenomenon of the Being-in-the-world. 
1. The Paralogism of Pure Reason 
In Heidegger's view, the Paralogism of Pure Reason has two positive 
aspects: "Fc>r one thing, he sees the impossibility of ontically reducing the T to a 
substance; for another thing,-he holds fast to the T as ‘I think，” (BT 367); it 
finally arrived to the conclusion that the ontical theses about the soul-substance 
which have been inferred from these characteristics are without justification" (see 
BT 366). 
We shall only make a provisional interpretation ofKant's work. It is because 
our interpretation is guided by Heidegger's comments. In §64，Heidegger 
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comments that Kant's critique is “a strict conformity with the phenomenal 
content given in saying T,，(BT 366). Therefore, we shall now elaborate how 
Kant's critique of the paralogism is incorporated into the discussion of the 
phenomenon of saying 'T'. 
In the Paralogism of the Substantiality (CPR A348)^^ Kant said that the 
substantiality of the 'T' is inferred from the judgement “I think": the “1”，as a 
thinking entity, the absolute subject of all my possible judgements, and this 
presentation of myself cannot be used as predicate of any other thing; Therefore I, 
as a thinking entity (soul), am a substance. Heidegger describes this paralogism 
similarly as, "something simple, [the T ] is not an attribute of other things; it is 
not a predicate" (BT 366). Heidegger thinks that the concept of 'T' is merely 
derived from Dasein's everyday immediate understanding of saying “I” The 
paralogism of simplicity is reinterpreted in the following way: 
With the “1”，this entity has itself in view. The content of this expression 
is regarded as something utterly simple. In each case, it stands for me 
and nothing further (BT 366). 
Likewise, the paralogism of personality is reinterpreted as "What is expressed 
A 
and what is addressed in saying 'F, is always met as the same persisting 
something" (BT 366). With this reinterpretation of the paralogism, what Kant 
35 Kant, Crtique ofPure Reason, Trans. Wemer S. Pluhar, Indianaplois: Backett 
Publishng Company: 1996. 
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denounces as transcendental illusion is interpreted under the heading of the 
ontical experience of the 1， 
The Kantian critique of the paralogism of pure reason is to be reinterpreted 
as the retrieval of the phenomenal content of I-saying. Saying “1” does not infer 
an ontical experience of the ego as a thing. The understanding of the 'T' in 
Dasein's I-saying is then to be backed up by Kant's critique. The ontical 
understanding of the 'T' is then examined by the question: "whether we have 
experienced ontically in this way may be Interpreted ontologically with the help 
of 'categories' mentioned，，(366 [318]). Likewise, Heidegger says: 
Kant shows for the first time that in no sense can anything be asserted 
about the ego as spiritual substance by means of an application of the 
categories to the ego as “I think" (BP 144). 
"Categories", according to the Transcendental Logic in CPR, are the forms of 
possible combination which thinking can accomplished as combining. It can only 
be applied to objects of experience. Because the ego is “I think", which is in 
every thinking the condition of the possibility of the unifying I-combine, it is also 
the condition ofthe categories. Therefore, the ego, as the synthetic original unity � ‘ 
of apperception, cannot be determined by categories. 
The categories are not applicable to the ego for another reason: since all 
thinking is an “I think something", the ego is not any arbitrary point but the “I 
think” It accompanies all representations as the possibility of them. Thus, Kant 
said, 
36 Heidegger and the Subject, p.78. 
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I am not conscious to myself as I appear to myself，nor as I am in 
myself, but am conscious only that I am. This presentation is not a 
thought, not an intuition (CPR B157). 
The ego as the synthetic original unity is not the manifold or the combinable, but 
the combining and condition of combining of the manifold. The “I think" cannot 
be intuited as what it is, but only known as that it is. And categories are 
applicable only where the combinable is given. Thus, categories are, again, not 
applicable to determine the ego. 
Heidegger sees that the demonstration of the inapplicability of categories on 
the ego is a main breakthrough of the tradition. It shows Kant's refutation of the 
possibility of ontically reducing the “1” to a substance. Thus, the saying “1” is 
indeed a phenomenon of "I am conscious of ..." and the “1” is neither a self-
intuition or a substance. The phenomenal content of saying “1” is exhibited 
primarily as the “I combine" and “I think". 
2. The fall back to the indeterminacy of substance 
Although Heidegger agrees that Kant's critique is “wholly right when he 
declares the categories, as fundamental concepts of nature, unsuitable for 
determining the ego" (BP 145). But it does not follow from the inadequacy of the 
categories of nature that every ontological interpretation whatever of the ego is 
impossible. Heidegger thinks that the refutation of paralogisms achieves no more 
than a refutation. He says that Kant has only “rejects a wrong ontical explanation 
of the T ; he has by no means achieved an ontological hiterpretation of Selfhood, 
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nor has he even obtain some assurance of it and made positive preparation of it" 
(BT 366). 
Heidegger quotes the note in Kant's Critique ofPure Reasom 
The I think expresses the act of determining my existence. Hence the 
existence [of myself] is already given through this I think; but there is 
not yet given through it the way in which I am to determine that 
existence, i.e., posit the manifold belonging to it. In order for that 
manifold to be given, self-intuition I required; and at the basis of this 
self-intuition lies a form given a priori, viz., time, which is sensible and 
belongs to the ability to receive the determinable. Now unless I have in 
addition an different self-intuition a different self-intuition that gives， 
prior to the act of determination {des Bestimmens], the determinative 
[das Bestimmende] in me (only ofits spontaneity am I in fact conscious) 
just as time so gives the determinable, then I cannot determine my 
existence as that of a self-active being; instead I present only the 
spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the [act of] determination, and my 
existence remains determinable always only sensibly, i.e, as the 
existence of an appearance. But it is on account of this spontaneity that I 
call myself an intelligence (CPRB158). 
In this passage, Heidegger criticizes that Kant falls back to the tradition by saying 
time is the form of sensibility. The 'T' exists as an intelligence that is the 
indispensable requirement for the possibility of experience. It is conscious solely 
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of its power of combination.^^ What the intelligence cognizes of itselfis the "pure 
ego, the "logical I” that is the form of consciousness (see CPR B405-409).^^ 
Thus，it presents itself only as the spontaneity of thought that cannot be intuited 
in term of time relation. Since “time，’ is the form of sensibility, and the 'T' is not 
intuitable in terms of time, thus, “I have no self-intuition". Because of the 
inapplicability of categories, Kant at the same time rejects all kinds of ontological 
determination of the ego. Heidegger said that since Kant assigns time to 
sensibility, that he only has natural time in view. It is obvious that Kant's 
interpretation remains within the metaphysical tradition. 
In §6 of Being and Time, Heidegger criticizes that Kant failed to achieve an 
insight of Temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. Even though he brings time back to the 
subject again, his analysis remains oriented towards the traditional way in which 
time is ordinarily understood as a natural concept. Thus, the connection between 
time and the subject (“I think") "shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even 
become a problem" (BT 45). Heidegger criticizes that it shows that Kant "shrinks 
back, as it were, in the face of something which must be brought to light as a 
37 See CPR B158, “I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely ofits power 
� 
of combination." 
38 Heidegger also points but the pure ego is the Kantian "Tersonalitas 
psychologica,,一the personality in the formal sense. Heidegger points out the Neo-
\ 
Kantian, e.g. Rickert's, epistemological understanding of the logical ego as the 
"logical abstraction" is only a misinterpretation. Rather, the Kantian "logical ego"' 
only stands for the opposition to "intuitive". It is being conscious as the spontaneity 
of thought only by transcendental apperception of the transcendental ego~the 
“logical subject" (CPR B407). This "logical ego” is not a logical abstraction that is 
universal and nameless as in Rickert view. Rather, since it is known to itself as its 
own. Heidegger said that "It pertains to egohood that the ego is always mine. A 
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theme and a principle if the expression 'Being' is to have any demonstrable 
meaning" (BT 45). Thus, he fails to give an ontology ofDasein or the subjectivity 
of the subject. Kant's contribution of the paralogism is only recognized as a 
negative criticism that is not even a positive preparation for the questioning ofthe 
selfhood of the ego. 
3. Kant's return to the res cogitans 
By settling the phenomenal content of the ego is the “I think" rather than an 
'T', Kant also establishes the “I think" in the Cartesian tradition of res cogitans. 
Kant says, “I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking thing，from other 
things outside me (which include my body)” (CPR B408). The interpretation of 
the “things outside of me" shows that Kant gets into the same problem 
concerning the difference between res cogitans and the res extensa as Descartes 
did. 
Heidegger criticizes Kant for his insufficiency of differentiating the Being of 
Dasein and the Being of the present-at-hand. Dasein is also regarded as 
something present-at-hand. In this line of thinking, Heidegger thinks that Kant's � • 
“I think" is only another Cartesian cogito that the ego is cut off from its world. 
Thus, the criticism is not focus on the proof itself but on the ontological 
presupposition that Dasein is just a present-at-hand. We shall discuss Heidegger's 
criticism in two points: (a) the indeterminacy of the ego as suhjectum\ (b) the 
ontological inadequacy of omission ofthe world. 
nameless ego is an absurdity" (BP 130). 
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0. The indeterminacy of the Being ofres cogitans 
Kant states that the ego cannot be determined by categories and is not a 
"substance". It is rather a "logical subject" that it is an “I combine” However, in 
all kinds ofcombining, this ‘subject, always underlies. It is the hypokeimenon— 
the subjectum-ih2iX is present for determinations. Since this logical subject 
cannot be determined by categories to be an I-substance，Kant only determine the 
subject, like Descartes does, a thinking thing {res cogitans) (see CPR B409). So， 
the Kantian subject, just like Heidegger's reproach to Descartes, is built on the 
indifference to Dasein's ontological difference from the other entities, and the 
Being ofthis entity is，again, left undetermined. 
However, Heidegger thinks that the Kantian ego is more sophisticated than 
the Cartesian res cogitans. He points out that Kant's ego has a threefold structure 
of the person: the transcendental person (self-conscousness), psychological 
(logical) person and the moral person. Heidegger thinks that the unity of the 
transcendental and the psychological person determines the concept of rational 
personality. Nevertheless, the moral person is the center of the personality that 
includes the former two concepts. He thinks that the moral person is the 
"personality proper" (BP 132). We shall not go into detail of this interpretation, � 
but we shall only discuss one point that why Heidegger thinks Kant falls back to 
‘ . ‘ 
the tradition. 
In §13 of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger declares that 
"Kant's interpretation of the phenomenon of respect [Achtung] is probably the 
most brilliant phenomenological analytic of the phenomenon of morality that we 
have from him"(BP 133). In the Heideggerian interpretation, “respect” is the 
essential moral self-consciousness. It is different from the theoretical “I think 
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myself，，It is rather the "I feel my existence". That moral feeling is "a making 
manifest of the ego in its non-sensible character, a revealing of itself as an acting 
entity" (BP 133). Respect is a self-subjection to the moral law. It is the active 
ego's respect for itself as the self, which is not understood by means of self-
conceit, and self-love. Heidegger quotes from Kant that, “respect always goes to 
person alone, never to things" (BP 135). Heidegger says， 
I subject myself in respect for the law to my own self as the free self, in 
this subjection of myself I am manifest to myself; I am as I myself. The 
question is，As what or, more precisely, as who? (BP 135). 
Moreover, Heidegger thinks that the self-subjection, “in conformity with the 
content of that to which I subject myself and for which I have a feeling in my 
respect, is at the same time a self-elevation as a becoming self-manifest in my 
ownmost dignity" (BP 136). In respect, the “1” is the end in myself. Heidegger 
continues: 
Man exists as an end in himself; he is never a means, not even a means 
for God; before God, he is his own end. From this, from the ontological 
characterization of the entity that is not only viewed by others as an end �— ， 
and taken as an end but exists objectively~actually—as an end, the 
proper ontological meaning of the moral person becomes clear. The 
moral person exists as its own end; it is itselfan end. 
Only thus is the basis gained for distinguishing ontologically entities 
that are egos and entities that are not egos, between subject and object, 
res cogitans and res extensa (BP 13 8). 
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hi this interpretation, Heidegger thinks that Kant is different from Descartes 
because he raises a problem of ontological difference between person (Dasein) 
and nature (thing, Sache). The person is only “I myself, that is responsible to the 
question of"who" under the moral law, Heidegger will later interpret the Kantian 
moral ego in terms of the Being ofDasein as "for-the-sake-of' [Umwillen] itself. 
However，we shall not go into the detail of this interpretation. We point out only 
that Heidegger thinks that Kant has made an essential breakthrough from the 
tradition to reinforce the elevation of the modem subject. With the awareness of 
the ontological difference, Kant is distinguished from Descartes' indifferent to 
the mode ofBeing of the res. 
However, Heidegger contends that Kant, even though he points out the 
ontological constitution of the human Dasein, he still leaves the question ofBeing 
unanswered. He says. 
But does this clarify the Dasein's way of Being? Has the attempt even 
been made to show how the Dasein's mode ofBeing is determined with 
regard to its being constituted by purposiveness? We seek in vain for an 
elucidation of this questioning Kant，and indeed even for the question 
itself(BP 141). 
Thus, the analytic ofthe finality of the person is still a not enough to elucidate the 
ontological constitution of the ego. The question of Being of Dasein does not 
occur in Kant's work. He thinks, after all the effort of determining the person as 
the end of itself, it is disappointing that Kant still expresses the Being of person 
and the Being of things with the same word, "existence". In a harsh tone, 
Heidegger said，it is “Striking” (BP 147). Instead of questioning the Being of 
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person, Kant only presupposes both the person““res cogitans,,~and the res 
extensa are finite entities. By doing so, Kant presupposes the same basic 
ontological these of Descartes. Kant falls back to the tradition of Medieval and 
the Greek ontology that Being is determined in its createdness. In this sense, 
although Kant has succeeded in refuting the use of categories to determine the 
ego as a “substance，，，at the end，Kant is criticized of following the idea of 
“hypokeimenon” to determine the ego as subject [Subjectum] again. Heidegger 
says: 
pCant] takes this “1” as subject again, and he does so in a sense which is 
ontologically inappropriate. For the ontological concept of the subject 
characterizes not the Selfhood of the “/,，qua Self，but the selfsameness 
and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. To define 
the “1” as ‘subject, means to regard it as something always present-at-
hand. The Being of the ‘T, is understood as the Reality of the res 
cogitans. 
But how does it come about that while the “I think" gives Kant a 
genuine phenomenal starting point, he cannot exploit it ontologically, 
and has to fall back on the 'subject'-that is to say, something � • 
substantiall (BT 367). 
Heidegger thinks that the subject in the sense of hypokeimenon is only a steady, 
selfsame present-at-hand: it stresses on the permanent presence of the logical 
subject in consciousness. However, the ontological characteristics of the person 
as a self-subjection to the moral law, the end to itself are covered up. Thus, the 
hypokeimenon does not exhibit the Selfhood of the “I，，qua Self. It is only a way 
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of determining the Being of the present-at-hand in terms of substantiality~"a res 
cogitans. Heidegger criticizes: 
Yet even though in theory he has denied that the ontical foundations of 
the ontology of the substantial apply to the “1”，he still slips back into 
this same inappropriate ontology (BT 266). 
b, The omission of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world 
Heidegger regards the “I think" insufficient to resolve the problem of the 
existence of the external world. Rather, it falls back in the tradition that 
presupposes both the external world and ego as present-at-hand. Dasein, as 
Being-in-the-world is not a worldless subject. The isolated I as the consciousness 
does not resolve the "scandal of philosophy" not because Kant's proof is 
inadequate, “but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and 
makes request has not been made finite enoi4gh,, (BT 249). Thus, Kant is 
criticized that though he tries to establish the phenomenon of saying “1” as “I 
think”，he “has done so without starting with the ‘I think，itself with its full 
essential content as an “I think something" (BT 367). This “I think something" is � 
indeed the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. 
Such a result is criticized to be contradiction of Kant's refutation of the 
idealism (BT 247). Kant shows how intricate the question of the existence ofthe 
external world is and how what one wants to prove gets muddled with what one 
does prove and with the means whereby the proof is carried out. Kant calls it 
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"scandal of philosophy and ofhuman reason in general"^^. Kant shows that there 
is still no cogent proof for the "Dasein of things outside of us" which will put an 
end to skepticism. Kant thinks that "The mere consciousness of my own 
Dasein~~a consciousness which, however, is empirical in character~proves the 
Dasein of objects in the space outside of me".^ ® 
Kant's in presupposing both the distinction “in me" and the “outside of me”， 
and also the connection between them is considered “correct” However, he 
criticizes that “[Kant] is incorrect from the standpoint of the tendency of his 
proof，(BT 248). This tendency is shown by his uses of the term “Dasein”，which 
\means presence-at-hand [Vorhandenheit] in Heidegger's interpretation (see BT 
247). Heidegger thinks, that is “one thing remains striking. Kant speaks of the 
existence [Dasein] of the person as he does of the existence of a thing [DingY 
(BP 147). 
Heidegger points out that as long as the Being of Dasein and the "external 
world" are presupposed as present-at-hand, the “scandal of philosophy" will 
continue, and the proof of the existence of the external world will be expected 
and attempted to demonstrate again and again (BT 249). Even if Kant states the 
doctrine that the subject must presuppose and indeed always does unconsciously 
presuppose the presence-at-hand of the external world, he is still starting with of 
the external world. The whole problem of the existence of the external world is 
set on the omission of the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world (BT 249). 
39 See BT 247, Heidegger's quotation from a note in the Preface of Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
^ Quoted from BT 247，Heidegger's quote from CPR B275. 
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Therefore, although Kant shows that this “I think" as consciousness always 
accompanies empirical representations, he does not provide a definite 
determination of the "accompanying" or the way of Being of the ego. Heidegger 
says, “It has not been demonstrated the sort of thing which gets established about 
the Being-present-at-hand-together" of the things outside me and the thing “in 
me” (see BT 248-9). 
Heidegger thinks that the Kantian or the traditional metaphysics is insufficient 
to resolve the problem of existence of the world. It is the task of the Dasein 
analytic to disclose the "full essential content" of the phenomenon of the "saying 
T ” that this phenomenon is not merely an “I think", but an “I think something" 
(BT 367-8). Heidegger says. 
For even the "I think" is not definite enough ontologically as a starting-
point, because the "something" remains indefinite. If by this 
"something" we understand an entity within-the-world, then it tacitly 
implies that the world has been presupposed; and this very phenomenon 
of the world co-determines the state ofBeing of the 'T', if indeed it is to 
be possible for the 'T' to be something like an “I think something" (BT 
368) .� 
In the phenomenon of “I think something", the 'T' and the “something’，are 
ontologically related in the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. None of them is 
present-at-hand. The “something” would be interpreted as the ready-to-hand 
[Zuhanden] that is not an object of representation. Rather, it is always 
encountered as a tool for use, The “1” that Dasein have in view, is not a subject 
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but the Being-in-the-world. Thus, whenever Dasein expresses “I am", it actually 
expresses itself as an "I-am-in-a-world" (368 [321]). 
D. Conclusion 
Our conclusion is that through the confrontation of Descartes and Kant, 
Heidegger arrives at the phenomenologically ground of the answer to the 
question of “who” of Dasein. The answer to the question “who” is not just a “I 
am，’，but ‘‘I am in the world” Heidegger thinks that only when the phenomenon 
of saying ‘T, is rendered as an "I-am-in-the-world", can the genuine phenomenal 
content of saying 'T, be disclosed. Hence, only then can the answer be prepared 
for discussion. 
Taking ego as the res cogitans is a covering up of the question of Being by 
the investigation of an other entity. Heidegger stresses that Being is different 
from an entity. Referring the ontological determination of ego as a creation of 
God is only a disguise of the inability to discriminate God and substance and the 
indetermination of the meaning of "substance". Heidegger thinks that Descartes, 
the founder of the Modem philosophy who declares that “I am" as the first 
A 
unshakable truth, fails to determine the ego as an ontologically distinct subject. 
Comparing with Heidegger's reproaches on Descartes, Kant, however, is 
interpreted in a more positive manner. Heidegger thinks that Kant is capable to 
exhibit the phenomenon of saying ‘‘I am" into the "I think". Kant succeeds in 
refuting the paralogisms of determining ego as a substance. Kant is "correct" in 
refusing the determination of ego with ontical experiences. However, Heidegger 
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criticizes that Kant falls back in the tradition of seeing the “1” as a logical subject 
in the sense of hypokeimenon “again” 
The ultimate problem for Kant and Descartes is that they have mistaken the 
ego as a present-at-hand. Under this ontological presumption, the problem of 
external world cannot be settled. Moreover, the ontological difference of Dasein 
is neglected. Heidegger thinks that Kant has almost succeeded to establish a full 
exhibition of saying “1” However, the representation of thing “outside of me" 
and the cognition of the logical subject ' T are all representations in terms of 
present-at-hand. Heidegger criticizes that Kant does not see that Dasein is a 
Being-in-the-world. The phenomenon of the world and the phenomenon of 
saying “1” are rooted in Dasein's Being. Heidegger points out that whenever 
Dasein is an “I think" it is already an “I think something". Only if the 
phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is correctly understood, can one understand 
that Dasein and the intraworldly entities are phenomenological connected. 
Heidegger says: 
If, in the ontology of Dasein, we “take our departure" from a worldless 
“ r in order to provide this 'T' with an Object and an ontologically 
baseless relation to tat Object, then we have presumed not too much, but 
too little (BT 363). 
Heidegger thinks Kant and Descartes have completely overlooked the 
phenomenon of the world, which is in fact an existential structure of Dasein. A 
correct understanding ofDasein's self-expression as “I am in the world" can only 
be established in the understanding of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. The 
"world" is presumed in the Being of Dasein that as long as it is, it is not an 
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isolated or worldless subject. Rather, it is already "in" a world. The meaning of 
“in” or Being-in the world will be explicated in the next chapter. 
Therefore, the question of "who" ofDasein is to be rendered not as an “1”，but an 
"I-am-in-the-world". Heidegger says: 
But ifthe Self is conceived “only” as a way ofBeing of this entity, this 
seems tantamount to volatilizing the real “core’，of Dasein. Any 
apprehensiveness however which one may have about this gets its 
nourishment from the perverse assumption that the entity in question 
has at bottom the kind ofBeing which belongs to something present-at-
hand, even if one is far from attributing it the solidity of an occurrent 
corporeal thing. Yet man's “substance” is not spirit as a synthesis of 
soul and body; it is rather existence (BT 153). 
In the above discussion, we have already seen how Heidegger "volatilizes" the 
question of ego of the tradition of Kant and Descartes who in fact represent the 
entire history of philosophy. At the end, Dasein can only be explicated in its 




The everyday " l"-so close yet far away 
The analytic ofthe "l-am-in-the-world" 
A. Introduction 
The phenomenological Interpretation ofDasein's whoness in Being and Time 
takes a distinctive approach by making a doubt on the obviousness 
{Selbstverstandlichkeit] of the answer, “I am this Dasein". Heidegger states, 
"Ontically, ofcourse, Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is closest: 
we are it, each ofus, w^ ourselves. In spite of this, or ratherforjust this reason, 
it is ontologically that which is farthesf, (BT 36). Heidegger contends that the 
obviously "given" 'T' is in fact ontologically undetermined. He thinks that the 
ontical obviousness of the fact that Dasein in each case mine, covers up the 
possibility ofthe ontological problematic of the whoness ofDasein. Not only so， 
in the analytic ofthe everydayness, the ontically obvious “1” is demonstrated to 
be "indefinite and empty" (BT 368). This chapter aims at an explication of how 
and why the above quote can work out an ontological description of Dasein can 
be worked out. 
Since the ontical certitude of the givenness of the I is under question, how can 
the Dasein analytic be undertaken to reveal the phenomenon of Dasein which 
says always “I am it”？ Heidegger states that although "Dasein is ontically 
‘closest，to itselfand ontological farthest", and "pre-ontologically it is surely not 81 
a stranger" (BT 37). The access to the phenomenon ofDasein is then gained from 
Dasein's "pre-ontological" proximity to itself. 
In Being and Time, this pre-ontological way of expressing its mineness is 
called "everydayness" [AUtaglichkeit]. "Everydayness" does not stand for the 
primitive state of the Being ofDasein (§11). Rather, it is the existential structure 
of Dasein which is proximally and for the most part [zunachst und zumeist] 
absorbed in its world because Dasein is a Being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]. 
In the phenomenological Interpretation of the Being-in-the-world, what is 
“closest” to Dasein is the environment—the “world” The everyday Dasein is 
proximally and for the most part "absorbed" in the world. Dasein's understanding 
of i ts own Self is found in the way that it comports itself according to the world. 
To render this ontological structure of Being-in-the-world, we shall elucidate the 
meaning of“world” in two aspects: the “work-world’’ [Werk-welt] and the "with-
world" {Mitwelt]. 
The work-world reveals that Dasein is always closest to its concern, its world. 
What comes to Dasein as its closest is the work. The structure of work-world 
opens Dasein's primordial relationship of Being to the Being of readiness-to-> ‘ • 
hand. Ontically, there is always a structure of"in-order-to" that govems Dasein's 
letting-something-be-involved to be equipment. Ontologically, in the 
understanding o f the in-order-to's of the equipment, Dasein always has itself in 
view. Even though it is only an existentiell mode of self-understanding, Dasein is 
always determined as something that which has its Being as an issue. Since what 
is closest to Dasein in the work-world is the equipment, we shall explicate how 
the equipment become “close”�to Dasein. What is "close by” or “here” for Dasein 
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is only an existential description ofDasein's spatiality. Bringing something close 
(de-severant [Ent-fernung] is again a way of Being-in in the world of concem. 
Thus, the "I-here" do not has the metaphysical primacy, Lideed, if Dasein 
expresses itself as the “I-here”，it only reveals that Dasein is absorbed in its 
world. 
In the existential analytic of the with-world, Heidegger understands Dasein as 
a Being-with. That the Others are "there" in Dasein's own world is its ontological 
determination. It signifies that the world is not a personal-world but a common 
world. Dasein and the Others are there in the one world. By the term "Others", 
Heidegger does not mean "everyone else but me~~those over against whom the 
'T' stands out" (BT 54). This “Other’，is not definite. Indeed, in its everydayness, 
the Dasein itself is "Others". Heidegger calls this way of everyday being the 
Others the "They" [da Man]. In Dasein's everydayness, the “who” is not an “I 
myself, but the "They-self' [das Man-selbst] (BT 167). Thus, Heidegger says, 
“Proximally, it is not T , in the sense of my own Self, that ‘am，，but rather the 
Others, whose way is that ofthe ‘They’” (BT 167). 
Dasein's closest way of Being is not the “1” but the “They” It signifies that 
not only that ontologically the I is not determined and farthest, but also that the 
ontical obviousness ofthe I is. still concealed. 
S. Dasein's everyday work-world 
This section is a study of Dasein's everydayness in terms of the work-world 
[Werkwelt]. It is related to our question of who of Dasein because in its 
everydayness, Dasein always fmds itself being along with the equipment when 
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Dasein is at work (BT 153). "Everydayness" is an ontological structure that 
characterizes Dasein's Being as "Being-in-the-world". Li §71, Heidegger 
explains that "Everydayness" "stands for that way of existing in which Dasein 
maintains itself "every day" [alle Tage\, it is “a definite ‘how, of existence by 
which Dasein is dominated through and through ‘for life”’ [zeitlebens] (BT 422). 
The ontological structure of the work-world dominates Dasein's 
everydayness. This work-world is not something being imposed on Dasein. 
Rather, it is the environment according to which, Dasein behaves (comports) 
itself {sich verhalt]. It implies a specific everyday way of Being of Dasein that 
Dasein concerns itself with the entity it encounters at work. An entity within-the-
world is ontically understood^^ as equipment. The ontological explication of 
Dasein's self-understanding shows that the disclosedness of the Being of 
equipment as involvement [Bewandtnis] also reveals Dasein's own situatedness 
in the work-world. 
The “world” that is rendered in terms of the work-world is a structure of 
Dasein's ontological self-understanding. Therefore, the world is interpreted as an 
existentiale of Dasein. The world is not extemal to Dasein but it is Dasein's 
ontological suitatedness in the totality of involvement. The entities as ready-to-
hand are proximally encountered in their uses: Dasein does not encounter the 
41 We should bear in mind that "understanding" in the Heideggerian context has 
nothing to do with "representation", "theoretical grasping". This mode of 
"knowing" is meant to grasp the essence or property of the present-at-hands. 
Present-at-hand is neither the mode of Being of Dasein nor the equipment. 
Heidegger always use the term "understanding" [ ''verstehen", 'Verstand", or 
"Verstandnis"] forthephenomenological sense of"disclosing" ["Erschliessen"]. 
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computer as a computer-in-itself; Dasein assigns the significance of the computer 
as a reference [Verweisung] to what it is used for. Hence, the world is a 
"referential totality" wherein Dasein makes sense of the ready-to-hand in the in-
order-to {Um-zu] structure. Heidegger calls it the "ontical-existentiell" meaning 
of the world. 
On the other hand, Dasein's everydayness is "the structure of existentiality 
lies a priori. And here too, Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way” 
(BT 69). In the explication of the structure of the world as the "totality of 
involvement", the ontological formal indication of "existence" is concretized by 
the exhibition of Dasein's "comportment" [Verhalten] in the work-world. An 
ontological analytic of the work-world is not merely a necessary step for the 
answering to Dasein's "who" in its everydayness. It is important for the 
explication ofDasein's existence. 
1. The Heideggerian concept ofthe “world，， 
The existential analytic of Dasein's everydayness is based on Dasein's 
ontological constitution as Being-in-the-world. "World" is an existentiale of � 
Dasein (BT 92). Heidegger says, “Dasein is its world existingly" (BT 416); and 
furthermore, “if no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there，either" (BT 417). He lists 
out four meanings of the concept of “world”. But we shall only discuss the two of 
them to clarify Heidegger's meaning of the work-world: 
1. "World" is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of 
those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world; and 
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3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense~~not, 
however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which 
can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as that “wherein” a 
factical Dasein as such can be said to “live” "World" has here a pre-
ontological existentiell signification. Here again there are different 
possibilities: “world，，may stand for the “public” we-world, or one's 
“own,，closest (domestic) environment (BT 93). 
Conceiving the "world" as the “sum total" of things present-at-hand is a 
“ordinary pre-philosophical concept" (BP 165-6). The world traditionally means 
“nature，，，“things” and the "universe of entities". However, "world" as the 
"totality of intraworldly entities presupposes world in the phenomenological 
sense that has yet to be defined" (BP 166). 
Tracing back to the Ancient Greeks philosophy, the ideas of "totality" and 
“world” have been renewed. Heidegger thinks that the concept of “world” is 
primarily rooted in the Greek expression “kosmos,, (MFL 171). “Kosmos” does 
not mean entities present-at-hand; it does not at all mean entities themselves and 
is not a name for them. Rather, he states that ''kosmos"' refers to the "condition" , 
[Zustand\\ >kosmos is the term for the mode of Being [Weise zu sein\. It is the 
"how" oftotality. Therefore, the meaning ofthe concept of"world" has from the 
outset of ancient philosophy, an ontological significance (ibid.). "Totality" is still 
the main characteristic of the "world" in the Heideggerian context. However, the 
question of totality is “hwnan Dasein's relationship to entities in its totality”!^: 
“Totality” neither depends on the entities within the world，nor does it signify the 
42 The Essence ofReason, pp. 82-83. 
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"sum total" of things. "Totality" denotes the existence of Dasein: it is the 
question how Dasein “free” the Being of entities as ready-to-hand, as equipment 
Zeug] and as involvement [Bewandtnis]. The world is the "wherein" of Dasein. 
As a "wherein" that Dasein “lives”，the world is rendered in Dasein's 
everydayness. It is explicated at two levels: (i) on the pre-ontological existentiell 
level that Dasein encounters other entities within-the-world; which is dominated 
by the “work” (ii) On the ontologico-existential level, the world is a structure of 
existence {existentiale) ofDasein. 
2. The ontico-existentiell explication of Dasein's work-world 
Dasein's closest everyday “world” is a "work-world" [Werhvelt] (BT 101). 
It is constituted by Dasein's ontico-existentiell understanding the way of the 
Being of Dasein, which Heidegger terms as "concern" [Besorge]. "Concern" is 
the way of Dasein's dealings [Umgang] in the world “which manipulates things 
and puts them into use" (BT 95). Everything within the world is discovered under 
the concern {Besorge] of getting the work done. As we have discussed in the last 
chapter, the entities within-the-world are primarily disclosed as “equipment” and 
"ready-to-hand". The “work-world”，Heidegger states, is the “referential totality 
within which the equipment is encountered" (BT 99). 
How does Dasein's using the ready-to-hands at work [in Arbeit] constitute it 
everyday “world’’一the totality of entity? The entities that are encountered 
within-the-world are not primordially grasped as occurring things. They are 
encountered as tools for Dasein's use. For example, a hammer shows itself as 
equipment which is ready-to-hand for making the shoes. However, the usability 
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of equipment discloses not merely one single piece of ready-to-hand in itself. In 
the moment that the equipment is being encountered, the world as a whole, in its 
totality is being opened up to Dasein. 
Hence, a pair of shoes does not stand by itself. The production itself is a 
using of something for something. In this case, the pair of shoes is being 
produced for wearing. In reference to the “work”，the materials: leather, thread, 
needles, and the likes are encountered. Furthermore the leather refers animal, 
whereas the hammer discloses the hammer manufacturers, the country of 
fabrication, the seller and the like. Similarly，the pair of shoes being produced 
will be sold to a customer: it is made to fit his or her feet, he or she “is，，already 
there along with the pair of shoes. 
When one ready-to-hand is being encountered in this “work-world,，， 
references and assignment of meanings show themselves right immediately to 
Dasein. It is because the hammer, the pair of shoes, the animal and the customer 
do not shows themselves as things themselves. They are not merely “related’，to 
one another. They are being disclosed at once in the use of the hammer in the 
structure of their relatedness. Therefore, Dasein's everyday encountering to a 
"work" is always a disclosure of the world as a referential totality. 
In the above explication of the work-world, we see that the entities within-
the-world are encountered as ready-to-hand. The Being of the entities that are 
encountered in the work-world is thus readiness-to-hand. This way of the Being 
of ready-to-hand manifests not only itself but also the world as the referential 
totality as a whole. The Being of ready-to-hand has therefore a specific 
ontological relationship to Dasein's Being and Dasein's world. 
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3. The ontologico-existential explanation ofworldhood 
From the above discussion, the Being of entities within-the-world is 
primordially discovered by Dasein as "readiness-to-hand". The world is 
proximally dominated by "work" and it is the referential totality of the ready-to-
hand. In Heidegger's description, a hammer makes sense by referring to nails; the 
hammering makes sense by the production of shoes; hammer, nails, shoes are 
“there” within the totality of reference. That is the ontico-existentiell meaning of 
the world. The Being of the ready-to-hand is freed (disclosed) as readiness-to-
hand for Dasein. Heidegger says: 
The "wherein" [Worin\ of an act of understanding of which assigns or 
refers itself，is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind 
ofBeing that belongs to involvement [Bewandtnis\\ and this “wherein” 
is the phenomenon of world (BT 119). 
The phenomenon ofworld is the “wherein” What does it mean? The “wherein” 
has to be a description of something “in，，something. It signifies that Dasein is 
"in" the world. Therefore, the phenomenon of the world as a "wherein" is meant 
to describe the way ofthe Being ofDasein as a Being-in-the-world. The world is 
not only a ^'Dasein's world", but also the ontological structure ofDasein. 
In §4，Heidegger stated that the characteristic of Dasein is that Being is 
always an issue for Dasein. In this ontological characteristic, Dasein is shown to 
have an understanding of Being. But this is only a formal indication of Dasein. 
The explication of the phenomenon of world is a contcretization of this formal 
indication: Dasein's everyday dealings with the equipment and the understands 
the Being ofequipment as "involvement" [Bewandtnis]. 
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In The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Kisiel points out that 
“Bewandtnis,, applies specifically to the Being of ready-to-hands. With the suffix 
“-sis”, Bewandtnis is thereby meant to formalize the ontological sense of their 
intentional state or quality of readiness-to-hand: the hammer is prepared to 
hammer, the knife is equipped to cut.^ ^ Heidegger says，“if something has an 
involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something" (BT 115). The 
Being of equipment is disclosed to Dasein in the using. Heidegger says that each 
single piece of equipment carries its own equipmental contexture along with it 
and it is this equipment only with regard to that contexture (BP 292). Equipment 
(ready-to-hand) has a Being of involvement because it has always been referred 
to a certain activity or purpose “in” something. 
Kisiel points out that the German “Be-wenden,, suggests more of a "dynamic 
stasis": a kind of turning in place, or verve potentializing the situation, the way 
the world tums, etc. It has an implication of "situatedness". In History of the 
Concept of Time, Heidegger refers the idea of Bewandtnis to “the child's 
question, ‘what is this thing?"' (HCT 260) Answering this question to the child, 
one must "bring out the referential correlation accessible at any given time" 
(ibid.). Thus, the answer must explain “what it is used for, defining what one � ‘ • 
fmds in terms of what one does with it" (ibid.). “It is for painting" is a most 
efficient definition of a crayon. Heidegger thinks that this "definition and 
interpretation" at the same time make reference to Dasein's Being-in-the-world, 
to Dasein's preoccupation of the "work". The crayon “is understood only when 
43 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, California: 
University ofCalifomia Press, 1993, p.389. 
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one has entered into the standing [Bewandtnis] which the environmental thing 
has" (HCT 261).^ Therefore, the crayon as a piece of equipment is then 
understood in its involvement. Jn Being and Time, Dasein's understanding ofthe 
Being of equipment as involvement is described as Dasein's relating itselfto the 
equipment. This self-relating is a "letting something be involved" 
{Bewendenlassen] (BT 117). Ontically speaking, it signifies that factical Dasein 
, � 
“let something ready-to-hand be [sein lassen] so-and-so as it is already and in 
order that it be such" (ibid.). This primordial understanding of the equipment is a 
"hermeneutic ‘as,,” that manifests before the verbal appresentation, the 
"apophantical 'as.，,^  
The understanding of the involvement of equipment is "hermeneutical" 
because it is always rooted in Dasein's self-understanding of its Being. Therefore, 
disclosing the Being of equipment is indeed a manifestation of Dasein's 
existence. To explain this ontological relation, Heidegger has given an example: 
That in which it [an equipment] is involved is the "towards-which" [das 
Wozu] of servicability, and the "for-which" [Wofur] of usability. With 
the "towards-which" of serviceability there can again be an 
involvement: wzY^  this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and 
44 As it is pointed out by John Macquame and Edward Robinson in the translators' 
note on BT 115，that there is no adequate English word for the German 
“Bewandtnis” and Bewenden". According to his studies on Heidegger, Theodore 
Kisiel translates “Bewandtnis” of The History of the Concept of Time into 
"standing". Even so, For the sake ofmaking consistent, we shall follow Macquame 
and Robinson's translation, i.e. "involvement" for “Bewandtnis”. (The reason of 
translating “Bewmdtnis” into "standing" in HCT, see Kisiel (1993): 389.) 
45 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time’ p. 391. 
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which we accordingly call a "hammer", there is an involvement in 
making something fast; with making something fast, there is an 
involvement in protection against bas weather; and this protection “is” 
for the sake of [um-willen] providing shelter for Dasein—that is to say, 
for the sake of a possibility ofDasein's Being (BT 116). 
When Dasein uses the hammer, it is disclosed as a piece of equipment and its 
Being is “involvement” The hammer is a equipment for a "towards-which". Its 
involvement is not determined on its own account. Rather, the equipment is 
determined as a piece of equipment because the "towards-which" is already in 
view. But the "towards-which" is in turn another equipment for other towards-
which's sake. The totality ofinvolvement is in fact under the contextual structure 
of "in-order-to". A hammer is let to be involved in the hammer for the sake of •.. 
and at the end, all in-order-to are for the sake of Dasein itself Heidegger 
describes that Dasein is the final "towards-which"; hence the understanding of 
the “work-world，，is ontologically constituted: “in its Being, that very Being is "^-; 
essentially an issue,, (BT 117). 
It should be noted that the description that Dasein as the fmal or the 
primarily "towards-which" of understanding of the Being of involvement is no 
longer an ontical description. .Itdescribes the Being ofDasein as the for-the-sake-
of-whieh {Umwillen] in its understanding of the Being of other entities. In 
explicating the relation between the structure of involvement and Dasein's Being, 
Kisiel has given a helpful analytic of Heidegger's using of the prefix “Be-” of the 
Bewandtnis: “5e-”signifies a way of finding ofDasein's own facticity out of the 
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contextual immediacy.^^ Hence, we see that “Bewandtnis” does not denote that an 
equipment is "involved" in something but it is "let be involved" for Dasein's 
concern. In this structure, who is being involved in something (the work) is 
indeed Dasein itself. Likewise, what is situated in the equipmental context is not 
the equipment but Dasein itself. The ontologico-existential description of the 
totality of involvement then signifies that in understanding of the Being of 
equipment, Dasein has already a self-understanding beforehand. Not only so, in 
the understanding ofinvolvement, Dasein is at the same time open to itselffor the 
possibility of itself. The understanding that is already there is not a static 
“knowledge” but a continuous disclosing through Dasein's existing in the work-
world. 
V 
The totality of equipment is not "formed" by extemal adding-up of affairs 
and work. It is Dasein's own situatedness in the work-world in its everydayness. 
Letting something be involved is then a way that something "concern my 
Dasein” However, this understanding of its 'own situatedness is only a pre-
ontological understanding according to its ontical potentiality-for-Being. It is 
Dasein's ontological structure of"comportment" [Verhalten • 
人 • 
4. The work-world and the lack of privilege of Dasein's I-here 
In the above discussion, we have explicated the phenomenon of world in 
Dasein's everydayness. In terms of Dasein's concern, it relatedness to the 
equipment is discussed. This phenomenon ofDasein manifests Dasein's existence 
46 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's Beingand Time’ p. 392 
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in its existentiell understanding of its own Being, According to the understanding 
of the totality of involvement and its potentiaUty-for-Being, Dasein always 
concerns itself in the context of work in its everydayness, 
We must refer back to our aim of exposition ofHeidegger's question on the 
"who" ofDasein. The Interpretation of the world contributes to the answering to 
the question of "who" of Dasein in the way that it clarifies the structure of 
everydayness. The work-world is the "wherein" that Dasein proximally dwelling. 
The “wherein’，does not mean a physical spatiality. Rather, it is an ontologico-
existential situatedness of Dasein. In its everyday existentiell understanding, 
Dasein's comportment manifests Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of the 
world as its "wherein". 
hi its comportment to the work-world, Dasein does not thematize its “who” 
However, it Being-a-Self that manifests itself. One example may be illustrated as 
the whole relation of the work-world and Dasein's Self: I open the door because 
it is time to go out for the bus. The door，the lock，the corridor and the elevator 
are disclosed as equipment. In addition, I have to attend a meeting and have to 
arrive on time. In every item encountered in the totality of involvement, the 'T' 
emerges not as a theoretical subject, the 'T' does not emerge as something a 
problematic. It is just the "one" who has to attend the meeting on time. 
Comportment characterizes Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. Also，it 
characterizes the powerful domination of work in Dasein's everydayness. Dasein 
"finds itself at work. Heidegger emphasizes: 
This elemental worldly kind of encountering, which belongs to Dasein 
and is closest to it, goes so far that even one's own Dasein becomes 
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something that it can itself proximaUy ready-to-hand with which it is 
proximally “come across” only when it looks away from "Experience" 
and the "center of its actions”，or does not as yet "see" them at. Dasein 
fmds itself proximally in what it does, uses, expects，avoids—in those 
things environmentally ready-to-hand with which it is proximally 
concerned (BT 155). 
Moreover, even if Dasein addresses itself as the “I here,，，this locative 
personal designation must be understood in terms of Dasein's spatiality. The 
linkage ofDasein's self-addressing as the I-here and spatiality is borrowed from 
W. von Humboldt. In his linguistic analytic, von Humboldt fmds that in some 
languages, the “1” is expressed by the “here，，，"you" by "there" and “he” by 
“yonder” In Heidegger's view，von Humboldt's insight of linking up the 
pronouns with the spatial adverbs is beyond the level ofLinguistics (BT 155). For 
instance, Heidegger has incorporated von Humboldt's insight into Dasein's 
existential spatiality to explain the existential relationship between Dasein and the 
ready-to-hand and that ofDasein and the Others. 
Heidegger thinks that the "here", “there”，and "yonder" are primarily not 
merely ways of designating the location of presence-at-hand. They are the 
characteristics ofDasein's primordial spatiality. He thinks that "these supposedly 
locative adverbs are Dasein-designations; they have a signification which is 
authentically existential" (BT 156). Heidegger states: 
Dasein understands its “here，，[Hier] in terms of its environmental 
“yonder，，[Dort]. The “here，，does not mean the ‘where, of something 
present-at-hand, but rather the "whereat" [Wobei] of a de-severant 
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Being-alongside, together with this de-severance [Ent-fernung] (BT 
142). 
"Deseverance" [Ent-femung] is the kind of Being which Dasein has with regard 
to its Being-in-the-world. The word "deseverant' has a signification which is 
active and transitive (BT 139). Heidegger's “Ent-fernung” is a play of word. By 
dividing up the “Entfernung” (“distance” or ‘‘removing，，）into “Ent-” (“dis-,’ or 
‘‘removing’’) and “ferrT (“far，，)，the new term has an opposite significant to the 
original word: it means “to make the famess vanish”，i.e. “bringing something 
close" (ibid.). Heidegger says, “Dasein is essentially de-severant" (ibid.). It 
means that Dasein lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. 
The existential meaning of bringing something close by is always a 
circumspective bringing-close: bringing something close by, in the sense of 
procuring it and putting it to hand. 
In Dasein's circumspective concern, the “distance” of something is not 
"measured" by its physical distance from Dasein as if they are two presence-at-
hands. Circumspective concern describes something by “at a stone's throw" or “a 
good walk". Dasein's own Being is always concerned in the bringing close of 
something ready-to-hand. That which is presumably “closest” is by no means that 
which is at the smallest distance “from us". Heidegger's example: the street 
beneath my feet is farther remote than the acquaintance whom I encounter “on 
the street" at a “remoteness” [Entfernung^ of twenty paces when one is taking 
such a walk (BT 141-142). Thus, the existential meaning of “closeness” and 
“famess” is not an “objective’，distance and it is not “subjective” either. The 
closeness and famess is measured with Dasein's involvement: whether one's 
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Dasein fmds itself"closer" related to something, or whether it concerns Dasein's 
Being more. 
The Dasein is not an I-here or a bodily I-thing. Heidegger says: 
Dasein understands its "here" in terms of its environmental “yonder” 
The "here" does not mean the "where" of something present-at-hand, 
but rather the "wherat" of a desseverance with its spatiality, is 
proximally never here but yonder; "here" only in the way in which it 
interprets its concemful Being-towards in terms of what is ready-to-
hand yonder (BT 142). 
In other words, Dasein is always stepped beyond itself towards the world of 
concem. It is not its "here" because it is driven towards, or absorbed in, its 
concem. Certainty, this “not its here" does not mean that Dasein is not “in its 
body” But it is to be understood existentially as that which is pre-occupied by its 
work. Since the ready-to-hand is the “yonder，’，Dasein in its concem is primarily 
absorbed in its relation to the yonder. According to the work-world, what is 
primarily encountered is not the “here myself, but the ready-to-hand that is useful 
to my Dasein. Referring back to the totality of reference, Dasein then fmds itself � • 
within its work. Hence, Dasein's understanding of its self as the I-here is always 
in terms of its work, the yonder. 
C- Dasein's everyday with-world 
The "world" of Dasein is not only a work-world. It is also a "with-world" 
[Mitwelt] (BT 163). By this ontological characterization of the world, the Being 
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of everyday Dasein is determined as Being-with [Mitsein\. It is the co-original 
determination of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein is not an isolated entity 
from its world. Rather, it is Being-in in the world wherein the Others are “with” 
them. The “world” is not a "subjective" world of my Dasein. It is a shared 
world. It is the world ofDasein and at the same time，the world of Others. There 
is no separation from Dasein's self-world to the with-world. Rather, "They are 
there with me in the one world" (HCT 240). 
Onitcally speaking, in the structure of involvement, the equipment always 
shows itselfwith the Others: the hammer is purchased at someone's shop; when I 
go to the meeting, I am expecting to see someone; even the strangest man I 
encounter on the road are in my world and is experienced as such in avoiding or 
passing each other by. 
To clarify the meaning ofDasein's with-world, we shall focus on two points: 
(1) revealing Dasein as the Being-with and the world as a with-world through the 
explanation of the encountering of the Others. (2) However, there is a tension 
among Dasein's Being-with and its Being-a-Self. In everydayness, Dasein's 
Being-its-Self is thus taken away by the Others and its everyday Selfis not itself 
but the “They” [das Man\ Proximally and for the most part, this “They-self, is 
the way that Dasein maintains itself in the everydayness. Therefore, through the 
explication ofthe “They”，Heidegger arrives at the answer to Dasein's everyday 
“whoness” Heidegger explains, "Proximally, it is not 'I,' in the sense ofmy own 
Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way is that of the ‘They，” (BT 167). 
Our question why Heidegger thinks that the ontical closest ‘T，is in fact farthest 
to Dasein is answered. 
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1. The primacy ofDasein over the encountering of Other 
Thus, the Others are also encountered “in” the world. The encountering ofthe 
Others is described a structure ofDasein's Being-in-the-world as follow: 
a. The Others are encountered within the world through the encountering of 
the equipment, 
“The expression ‘Dasein’，however, shows plainly that ‘in the first 
instance，this entity is unrelated to Others, and that of course it can still be ‘with， 
Others afterwards" (BT 156 [120]). Heidegger stresses that as a Being-in-the-
world, Dasein proximally and for the most part discovers the ready-to-hand first. 
In the last quote, the “in the first instance" is put within quotation marks to 
signify that it does not have a chronological sense. The encountering of the 
Others is constituted by Dasein's Being-in-the-world. The ‘‘wherein’，ofDasein is 
primarily a work-world in which the totality of involvement and the totality of 
equipment are disclosed and the Others are encountered afterwards. In The Basic 
problems ofPhenomeonology, Heidegger says，“the Dasein is also not first 
merely Being-with Others; instead, Being-with Other means Being-with-in-the-
world" (BP 278). 
Moreover, the Others are encountered through the ready-to-hand. For � 
example: the Others are encountered as friends I want to meet, for whom I 
‘ . . 
brought a present. When we see a boat anchored on the shore, it may belong to an 
acquaintance who is going to make a voyage. Even if it is a “boat which is 
strange to us", it is still indicative to the Others. Thus, the Being of the Others is 
therefore determined as the characteristic of Dasein's everydayness. In Dasein's 
everydayness, Dasein is proximally and for the most part absorbed in the world 
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under concern. The Others are “there，，with me in the world of concem (HCT 
239). 
b, The ontological difference between the ready-to-hand and the Others 
The Being of the Others that Dasein encounters within the world is different 
from the Being of ready-to-hand. It is because the Others have the same kind of 
Being ofDasein. Heidegger calls the Being of Others “Dasein-with” [Mitdasein]. 
It signifies that the Others that they are “in” Dasein's world by the way ofBeing-
in-the-world (BT 154). 
Dasein's Being-towards the Others is called "solicitude" [Fursorge]. In 
comparison to Dasein's "concem" itself towards the ready-to-hand, solicitude 
describes Dasein's relatedness to the Others; it is an existentiale of Dasein as 
well. Heidegger says, even the “concem” with food and clothing，and the nursing 
ofthe sick body, are forms of solicitude (see BT 158). hi addition, “Being-for， 
against, or without one another, passing one another by, not “ 'mattering' to one 
another" are possible ways of solicitude (ibid.). Jn whichever modes mentioned 
above, solicitude manifests as the state of Being of Dasein's Being-with (BT � 
159). 
c. The Others are “/rt” the world by way ofBeing-in-the-woM 
In Dasein's own world, each one of the Other is a Dasein, who is there too 
with every Dasein [es ist auch und mit dd\. The word "with" [mit] is reserved to 
the relationship between Dasein and the Others. In fact，Heidegger said that the 
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“with” is something of the character of Dasein; the “too” means a sameness of 
Being as circumspective concemful Being-in-the-world. He stresses that "with" 
and “too” are to be understood existentially as an ontological description of 
Dasein (see BT 154). 
The "with" signifies Dasein's Being-in “in” a world that the Others are there 
“too” The Others are within the totality of involvement of one's own Dasein. 
Likewise, one's own Dasein is also in the totality of involvement ofthe Others' 
too., The Others are “there” in its world as long as Dasein exists. The 
encountering ofthe Others is "still oriented by that Dasein which is in each case 
one's own" (BT 154). The “with” does not signify physical side-by-side-ness. 
Moreover，the world is indeed not exactly "Dasein's world’，only. It is a shared 
f 
world—the "with-world" [Mitwelt] (BT 155).^ ^ Dasein's Being-in in the world is 
essentially a Being-with {Mitsein]. 
cL The Others is encountered in Dasein，s own Being-with, And Dasein，s Being-
I is always a Being-with 
• The ontological condition that the Others are encountered in the world is 
» 
based on Dasein's ontological constitution: it is Being-in in a with-world, the 
Being-with {Mitsein]. In order words, the relationship between Dasein and Dasein 
is possible only on the basis ofBeing-in-the-world (BP 278). The Being-with is 
said to be the "formal condition of possibility of the co-disclosure of the Dasein 
of the Others for the Dasein which is in each case one's own" (HCT 238). 
Therefore, the ontological description of Being-with is not based on the factical 
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occurrence of the Others. It does not seek to establish ontically and factically “I 
am not present-at-hand alone, and that the Others of my kind occur" (BT 156). In 
fact, "Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically 
no Others is present-at-hand or perceived. Even ifDasein's Being-alone is Being-
with in the world". Thus, “the Others can be missing only in and for a Being-
with" (BT 156-7). 
2. Dasein's everyday Being-I and the Others 
There is an internal tension within the structure of Being-with between 
Dasein's Being-one's-Selfand its Being-with-one-another. On the whole, Dasein 
is essentially a Being-with; because its understanding of Being has already 
implies the understanding of the Others. Therefore, "knowing oneself’ 
[Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with, which is understood by Dasein 
primordially. By the same token, Dasein's Being-I is already a Being-with. 
Whenever Dasein says “I am”，it also implies the understanding of the Others. It 
reveals that Dasein and the Others are all Being-in-the-world with one another in 
the with-world. However, in the analytic of Dasein's everydayness, Heidegger 
fmds that it is precisely because there is always already an understanding of the 
Others, Dasein does not come to a genuine understanding of itself. Dasein's 
Being-with is the condition that Dasein fails to be itself. 
The tension of Dasein's Being-one's-Self and its Being-with-one-another 
occurs in Dasein's everydayness. On the one hand, being “itsdf，，Dasein has a 
47 3gg HCT 237, "The environing, we said, is not only mine, but also ofthe Others". 
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constant care that one is different from the others. Dasein addresses itself as an 
'T', it always understands that this 'T' is not the Others. On the other hand, 
Dasein in its everydayness clings to level off the distance between Dasein's own 
Self and the Others'. There is a tendency of making Dasein an average one 
among the Others. 
Dasein's authentic distantiality [Abstdndigkeit] belongs to Being-with. 
However, it is hidden from the everydayness because everyday Being-with-one-
another stands in subjection [Botmdssigkeit] to Others (see BT 164). The Being 
of Dasein is taken away. In the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger 
describes that the phenomenon of distantiality is a constant care. In its 
everydayness, Dasein's being apart from the others is covered under the ontical 
obviousness of the “1” However, “Pasein] is not aware of it that this kind of 
Being with the Others is perhaps much more stubbornly and primordially there" 
(HCT 245). In its own everyday involvement, Dasein is not itself. Instead, Dasein 
is always the indefinite Others. The Others are there as the structure ofDasein's 
Being-with which is not related to whether they are "actually" there. As taken 
away by the Others, Dasein's everyday "who" is the “They” [das Man]. It is not a 
particular one, but the anyone, the neuter. This “They”，who is no one in � ‘ 
particular and “all” are, dictates the modes ofBeing of everyday Dasein. 
Heidegger applies a serious of terms to signify the ways of Being of the 
“They” They are "distantiality", "averageness", "publicness", "disburdened", 
“leveling down", and "accommodation". The “They” tends to eliminate the 
difference and makes everyone the same. Of course, the sameness ofthem is just 
an undetermined familiarity. It is all in this Being of the ‘‘They” that Dasein 
addresses itself as an “1” 
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0. Distantiality，Averageness and Leveling down 
Being-in a work-world, Dasein is also Being-with-one-another in a public 
world wherein it encounters itself primordially. It is always' absorbed in the 
everyday multiplicity of concem. Li the everydayness, Dasein's care of its 
distance from the Others is meant either to find "one's own Dasein has lagged 
behind the Others and wants to catch up in relationship to them", or to find "one's 
own Dasein already has some priority over them and sets out keep them 
suppressed" (BT 164). However, this distantiality in everydayness is absorbed by 
concem and it is dominated by the Being-with-one-another. As absorbed, Dasein 
has the character of "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit] which is an existential 
character of the “They，，. 
The "They", in its Being, essentially makes averageness an issue of this. 
Everything tums for the “They’，，and averageness is the issue for it. That it is the 
structure which Dasein determines Dasein's ways of dealing with the world. 
Heidegger says that the “They，，keeps watching over everything exceptional that 
trust itself to the fore so that every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed 
(BT 165). In averageness, the original and primordial self-showing ofthings get 
glossed over as something that has long been well known. Heidegger further � 
describes this way of familiarization of matters “leveling down" [Einebnung] 
(ibid.). 
b. Publicness and the Common World 
The phenomenon of distantiality, averageness and leveling down are 
existentially interrelated and is constituted by "publicness" [die Offenlichkeit] for 
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the world is primarily a “common world". The "common world" is not the 
addition or putting together of several subjects by virtue of some arrangement. 
Heidegger says: 
We say instead the first thing that is given is the common world—the 
"They"-the world in which Dasein is absorbed such that it has not yet 
come to itself, just as it can constantly be this way without having to 
come to itself(HCT 246). 
The world is not "personal" to Dasein. Because it is a Being-with and it is 
primordially given in the common world where the Others are there too. The 
closest environing world is always the world where roads, strangers, family and 
work can be encountered. Out ofthis world, one can then more or less genuinely 
grow into his own world. Ontically speaking, the common world means the 
culture and society, in which Dasein is socialized to think and act in certain 
patterns. In everydayness, Dasein is primarily absorbed in the work-world and the 
with-world. Thus, Dasein “knows” itselfaccording to its work, e.g. a shoemaker 
among the thousands ofhis or her kind. In this way of self-understanding, Dasein 
is proximally a “They” Ontologically speaking, not only the ready-to-hand and 
the Others>but also Dasein itself are there in the common world. In this closest 
world，the self is not the primary concern because the world is dominated by the 
work and the Others which are the closest to Dasein. 
“Publicness” is the way that the “They” interprets the world and its own 
Dasein. This way of interpretation is further described as “idle talk" [Gerede]. 
Idle talk signifies the most common way that Dasein talks. And talking is 
primarily based on Dasein's Being as Being-with-one-another. It is “aimed at 
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bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed Being towards what is talked about 
in the discourse" (BT 212). This kind of discourse does not aim at making 
manifest the matter itself. Hence, the aim of communication takes over the 
original phenomenon of the thing itself. What is communicated depends only on 
the common concem and the average intelligibility of the hearer and the speakers; 
that makes the talked about always familiar. Thus, the primordial relationship to 
the Being of the matter itself is lost in the idle talk. Heidegger thinks that this 
kind of communication is only “gossiping and passing the words along" (BT 
212). It lacks ground to stand on {Bodenstandigkeit] and is a complete 
groundlessness [Bodenlosigkeit] (ibid.). It is just “talking over everything while 
not going ‘into the matters' and by virtue of an insensitivity to all distinctions in 
level and genuineness" (HCT 246). However, it is not meant to deceive. It only 
refers to the factical concem of the everyday Dasein that is a Being-with-one-
another. 
The "authority" ofthe public way of interpretation is ontologically revealed 
as the determination of Dasein's Being-with. It does not refers to any social 
institution and such an interpretation has no genuine knowledge ofthe world. By 
idle talk, the genuine Being of Dasein's own is also passed over and closed off. � ‘ 
One's own possibilities for Being are limited in the “They”. Dasein as a “They” 
is interpreted in the public idle talk is in tum cut off from the primordial 
understanding ofBeing of its own. 
106 
c. Disburdening 
In everyday idle talk，Dasein understands itself as the "They" that is cut off 
from its own authentic Being. The ‘They’，understands itself in the way that the 
public says without having its own kind of Being in view. Then，the "They" can 
have no definite ground to identify any particular Dasein. Heidegger says that the 
"They" is only an indefinite neuter. It is nobody: not “me，，，not the other (see BT 
164). The "who" ofDasein as an everyday “They” is therefore deprived from its 
answerability. Yet it is there alongside everywhere. And according to the way 
that the public does, “They，，presents every judgement and decision as if it is 
done by its own. Although it seems that ‘‘It ‘was, always the ‘They，who did it，” 
as it is pointed out, the they has been no one. Heidegger says, “in Dasein's 
everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which 
we must say that ‘it was no one，” (BT 165). In the publicness, the “They” 
disburdens [entlastet] Dasein. In other words, the everyday Dasein is in the 
"disburdening" [Seinsentlastung] of its own Being and becomes an indefinite 
nobody. Therefore, the answer to the question of the “who,，of Dasein is the 
disburdened, average “nobody” It has "surrendered" itself in the "They" and 
understands itself as only as the one among the other. Such a Being is called 
"Being ambng-one-other" [Untereindersein]. 
D. Conclusion 
From the above discussion, what is phenomenologically closest to Dasein is 
the environment that is rendered as the work-world and the with-world. The word 
"closest" is indeed grounded in Dasein's "de-severance". The world and the 
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entities within it can become "close by，，only because Dasein lets them be 
involved in its world. So, the meaning of"closeness" is only referred to Dasein's 
existential spatiality. That is，when a ready-to-hand is used, and when the Others 
are encountered in the totality of involvement, they become “close” to Dasein. 
The "closeness" of an entity always implies relatedness with Dasein in its 
concem, its work. Since Dasein encounters itself primarily in the world, and since 
the public itself defines the goals and views of Dasein in terms of the world of 
common concem, all fundamental concepts and expressions which Dasein first 
forms for itselfwill also probably be obtained in the world in which it is absorbed 
(seeHCT 248). 
Moreover, the "world" as the work-world and the with-world constitute the 
"wherein" [JVorin] ofDasein. Describing the world as the “wherein,，signifies the 
hermeneutical self-understanding of Dasein. It reveals Dasein's Being-in-the-
world and it always has its own Being as the issue for Being. Thus, "concem" 
[Besorge] is not only a “wanting to do something", rather it has its hermeutical 
meaning when we say, "something concerns Dasein” Comportment [Verha/ten] 
is the word to describe Dasein's existentiell understanding of its Being. 
According to the environment, Dasein comports itself in certain ways. The whole � • 
structure of Dasein's encountering to its world constitutes is ontologically “for 
the sake of，Dasein's own Being, even though it is only an everyday existentiell 
self-understanding. Thus, the world that is disclosed as Dasein's concem is in 
tum the "wherein" Dasein is absorbed^l As absorbed, it is the “They” 
招 Heidegger states, “its phenomenal structure shows that the authentic entity of 
Dasein, the who, is not a thing and nothing worldly, but it is only a way to be. If we 
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The phenomenological description of comportment of the Being-in-the-
world and the analytic of "Everydayness" of Dasein elucidate the "how" that 
Dasein maintains itself. But "everydayness" stresses more on Dasein's Being-
with-one-another and it tums out to be the "They". It then implies Dasein's 
failure to be itself. It disclosed Dasein as the "conceraful absorption” (BT 167) 
that is "living" among the Others. It is always subjected to the average 
Everyone—the publicness. 
At this stage, we can makes sense of Heidegger's assertion, "Ontically, of 
course，Dasein is not only close to us—even that which is closest; we are it, each 
of use, w^ ourselves. In spite of this, or rather for just this reason, it is 
ontologically that which isfarthesf, (BT 36). In the above sentence, what is the 
closest is now determined as the “They” in stead ofthe “1”. Though the "They" is 
closest to our Dasein, and according to the structure of everydayness, the “They” 
is inconspicuous. Ontically, the concemful absorption never shows itself as the 
“They” That is, since one is already the “They”，Dasein is not ready to know it is 
in fact the “They” but it only says，“I am" and this ontically familiar and 
closeness finally covers up its inauthenticity in its everydayness. Heidegger 
states, "When Dasein has itself in view ontically, it fails to see itselfin relation to � • 
the kind of Being that entity which is itself，(BT 368). Therefore, Heidegger 
adds, “Proximally the ‘who，ofDasein is not only a problem ontologically; even 
ontically, it remains concealed" (BT 152). 
follow the component elements phenomenally, we do not come upon an entity but 
upon the Dasein, insofar as it is in this specific way. This again justifies our 
designation of the entity which we ourselves are by the expression of Being, 
‘Dasein”，(HCT 247). 
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When Dasein says, “I am" in its everydayness, it expresses itself as the 
“They” Dasein's "everyday Self, ("They-Self) is the "who" who expresses itself. 
“What expresses itself in the 'T' is that Self which，proximally and for the most 
part, I am not authentically" (BT 368). However, does the “They-Self, not belong 
to the essential structure of Dasein? Yes indeed. We have to understand the 
“They-Self, in a non-substantial sense. The “They,，[Man] is only an indefinite 
‘‘neuter” It does not stand for any substantial entity. It is only a way ofBeing of 
Dasein in its everydayness. It only expresses an average, undifferentiated mode 
ofBeing. ifexpressed ontically, the everyday ‘ T is only an average everyone. 
The “They” is a way of Being that is constituted by Dasein's Being-in-the-\ 
world. The “They” is not meant to express a certain form offorce that is outside 
of Dasein. Thus, the existentialistic or sociological theories do not apply here. 
"Being-with" as one of its ontological structure is the root of the "They". 
Heidegger says, “Being-with and the facticity of Being with one another are not 
based on the occurrence together of several 'subjects'" (BT 157). Likewise, the 
"Others" are not the "other present-at-hand" who occur in Dasein's surrounding. 
They are understood as Dasein-with in the totality of involvement and reference 
ofDasein's world. It is through Dasein's Being-in in the world that can be Dasein � * 
“with” the Others. Therefore, the structural explanation of Dasein's "everyday 
Self，is not amount to an substantial entity. It is an ontological description ofthe 
Being of Dasein. Dasein still is itself and has its Being to be. Even in this 
inauthentic way ofBeing, Dasein is always “in each case mine". 
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Conclusion 
What is more astonishing than Heidegger's question of"who", starting from 
the “I am" and coming to the conclusion that it is not T but the ‘they，” (see BT 
167)? How do we perceive this “1”，ifthis “1” is not “I myself? If we ask again, 
‘‘who，，is this “1，，？ What does it means? Heidegger would say that this inauthentic 
self-understanding is structurally determined in Dasein's "everydayness". 
Heidegger explains that "everydayness" [Alltaglichkeit] is Dasein's average 
way of existing: 
"Everydayness" manifestly stands for that way of existing in which 
Dasein maintains itself"every day’，[“alle Tage"]. Yet this "every day” 
does not signify the sum of those “days” which have been allotted to 
Dasein in its “lifetime” Though this "every day" is not to be understood 
calendrically, there is still an overtone of some such temporal character 
in the signification of the "everyday" [''Alltag'^. But what we have 
primarily in mind in the expression "everydayness" is a definite “/zow” 
of existence by which Dasein maintains itself"for life" [zeitleben] (BT 
422).� 
Everydayness is the “how” that Dasein maintains itself till the end ofits life. 
It has an implication of “alle Tage”, weekdays, workdays. So that “work，，is 
implied. In our analytic of the “world”，we have shown that the “world” is the 
"work-world" [Werkwelt] for Dasein. It does not really mean a piece ofwork or a 
task to be done, the work-world is a totality of involvement ofDasein. The work-
world only expresses that Dasein exists in the existentiell structure ofin-order-to. 
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That in this sense of the world, all intraworldly entities are either ready-to-hand 
[Zuhanden] or Dasein-with [MitDasein] and none of them are present-at-hand. 
They are “in，，the world because Dasein has concem itself with them, i.e., they 
enter the world when Dasein let them be involved. Hence, in a sense, 
“everydayness” signifies the way ofBeing ofDasein as a Being-in-the-world. 
Moreover, "everydayness" has a stronger sense in signifying Dasein's 
Being-with-one-another. Heidegger always expresses that Dasein is “proximally 
and for the most part" [zunachst und zumeist] in its everydayness. He says: 
"Proximally" [zundchst] signifies the way in which Dasein is "manifest" 
in the with-one-another" of publicness, even if “at bottom” 
everydayness is precisely something which, in an existentiell manner, it 
has "surmounted". “For the most part" [zumeist] signifies the way in 
which Dasein shows itself for Everyman, not always, but “as a rule" 
(BT 422). 
“Everydayness” not only describes the way of Being-in in the work-world, 
but also，describes the way that Dasein understands itself as an average 
everyone—the “They” It describes Dasein's mode of Being that it is � ' 
"conquered" by the Being-with-one-another. It is a way in which Dasein shows 
itself for the "Everyman" [ J e d e r m a n ] ) 9 jn this sense, the everyday way ofBeing 
• - 、 
49"Everyman" is a play written by he Austrian poet Hugo von Hofinannsthal. It is 
based on the 15 century English morality play. It describes how the main role 
"Everyman" is save from the summoned of "Death" by his friends "Good deeds" 
and "knowledge". The von Hafinamisthal play has been produced at the Salzburg 
festival yearly since 1920. The reason why Heidegger mention this play is unknown. 
But by guess, he could means that, just as "Everyman" is put on the stage every 
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of Dasein is structurally determined to be a "They" without exception. It is not 
due to any personal weakness but it is grounded in the Being of Dasein. 
Heidegger calls it the “ ‘subject, of that kind of Being which we know as 
concemful absorption in the world" (BT 167). As long as Dasein's Being is 
understood as Being-with-one-another, it is "surrmounted" under the 
"dictatorship" ofthe 'They"(BT 422, 164). And this "They" is the most familiar 
and lies “closest’’ to Dasein and it seems to be onitcally “self-evident” Even so, 
the existential analytic ofthe “who” ofDasein cannot lie on this natural horizon. 
Therefore, even the answer to the “who” of Dasein is ontically closest as “I am 
it”，he only takes this as a way ofBeing. The everyday way ofBeing ofDasein is 
called "inauthenticity". Heidegger says: 
As modes of Being, authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and inauthenticity 
{Uneigentlichkeit] (these expression have been chosen terminologically 
in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact that any Dasein 
whatsoever is characterized by mineness [Jemeingkeit]. But the 
inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any “less，，Being or any 
“lower” degree of Being, Rather it is the case that even in its fullest 
concretion Dasein can be characterized by inauthenticity~when busy, � 
when excited, when interested, when ready for enjoyment (BT 68). 
year as a rule without exception, Dasein's way ofBeing in the publicness is also a 
routine. 
See Encarta, 98 DeskEncyclopedia, & © 1996-97 Microsoft Corporation. 
All rights reserved. 
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Even though the everyday Being of Dasein understands its Self as a “They’， 
in an undifferentiated way, it still manifests its Being, its existence and mineness. 
Thus, it is not to be taken as a mere “aspect’，(BT 69). The Dasein analytic 
succeeds to show that even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of 
existentiality~Being-in-the-world, existence and mineness lies apriori. 
How do we understand the paradoxical way of thinking that even when 
Dasein maintains itself inauthentically, i.e. the “1” is not myselfbut the “They”， 
and it is at the same time its own (or its “mine”)？ Raffoul correctly point out that 
Heidegger applies the term "inauthenticity" [Uneigentlichkeit] strictly different 
from "ungenuine" [unechtes].^^ He quotes from Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology'. 
The Dasein's average understanding of itself takes the self as in-
authentic [un-eigentliches]. This inauthentic self-understanding of the 
Dasein's by no means signifies an ungenuine [unechtes] self-
understanding ...The Dasein's inauthentic understanding of itself via 
things is neither ungenuine nor illusory, as though what is understood 
by it is not the self but something else，and the self only allegedly (BP 
160).� 
We have already said that inauthentic existence does not mean an 
apparent [scheinbare] or ungenuine [unechtes] existence (BP 171). 
In the above quotes, we can understand that even in the "inauthentic" mode 
of Being, Dasein is still itself genuinely. That means, since Dasein's ‘‘essence” 
50 Heidegger and the Subject.. 236-7. 
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lies in its existence and mineness (BT 67-8), the phenomenon ofDasein is always 
its own. However, since Dasein is Being-in in the world, being concemfully 
absorbed in the world is again a determined "way to-be” In other words，as long 
as Dasein “is，’，it has a way to-be according to its world. There is no exception, it 
is because, Dasein is not a present-at-hand that is indifferent to its Being nor is it 
worldless. We see there is two different levels of description: in the ontological 
formal indicative sense, Dasein is always its own and it shows itself in itself as 
itself whenever it is. The phenomenon of Dasein and the phenomenon of 
Dasein's saying ‘T，are always a genuine self-showing. 
“Being-lost” is another characteristic of the everyday inauthentic Dasein. 
Heidegger said, “This 'absorption m...'[Aufgehen] has mostly the character of 
Being-lost {Verlosenseins] in the publicness of the ‘They”，(BT 220). Heidegger 
point out that "Being-lost" means that Dasein is “in the first instance" fallen away 
{aufgefallen] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self. 
"Fallenness" [Verfallenheit] only means that Dasein is “in” the world. In earlier 
parts of the Division One of Being and Time, Heidegger uses a literally more 
neutral term "in" to describe the Dasein's Being-in-the-world. However, starting 
from the fourth chapter, he started to describe Being-in-the-world is a "fall" into � 
the world. This terminological divergence is based on the analytic ofthe "They". 
Heidegger said, “Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in 
subjection to the Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the 
Others" (BT 164). 
Therefore, Being-lost also describes Dasein's being absorbed in the world of 
work and of the Others. Thus, he further explains that “falling，，only means 
Being-in-the-world. The term "inauthentic" does not signify “really not, or 
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"Being-no-longer-in-the-world". It only signifies Dasein's distinctive 
characteristic ofBeing: Being-in-the-world (BT 220). Thus, "inauthenticity" does 
not signify a "fall" from a “purer，，or "higher ‘primal status.，” Neither does it 
have the ethical signification.^^ Heidegger also points says in the beginning ofthe 
treatise, “Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms ofa 
possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself (BT 33). Dasein in its inauthentic 
mode ofBeing, is always determined in its ontological constitution that it always 
has its possibility to be. 
Dasein's Being-lost in the publicness signifies the essential structure of 
"Being-with-one-another". Heidegger explains that the structure ofpublicness is 
“idle talk" {Gerede\. It explains the way Dasein in its everydayness understands 
itselfas an indefinite nobody, the "They". Heidegger said that idle talk is the way 
that things are publicly interpreted. It constitutes itselfin Being-with-one-another. 
It isjust far from letting itselfbe volatilized to something "universal". Since it is 
public, it belongs to nobody and “it is ‘really，nothing but occurs as “real” only in 
the individual Dasein which speaks. Since the idle talk does not first arise from 
certain circumstances which have effects upon Dasein “from outside” However, 
when Dasein is a Being-with-one-another, it always performs the idle talk and �“ • 
speaks in the way things have been publicly interpreted. In doing so，Dasein 
presents itselfthe possibility oflosing itselfin the “they” (BT 221). Hence, in the 
understanding of idle talk, we can understand what Heidegger means by saying 
that the “They” is a nobody. 
51 BW: 236. 
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Furthermore，in §40, Heidegger presents the meaning of inauthenticity more 
precisely: 
Dasein's absorption in the "They" and its absorption in the "world" of 
its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing [Flucht] of Dasein 
in the face of itself—of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being (BT 
229). 
Dasein is inauthentic because it fleets away from in the face of its authentic self. 
It implies that its authentic Being is always understood beforehand. Heidegger 
then explains, "only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itselfin an 
ontologically essential manner through whatever disclosedness belongs to it, can 
it flee in theface o/that in the face of which it flees” (BT 229). After all the 
negative elaboration, we can understand why Heidegger says. 
This undifferentiated character ofDasein's everydayness is not nothing, 
but a positive phenomenal characteristic to this entity. Out of this kind 
ofBeing—and back into it again—is all existing, such as it is" (BT 69). 
Therefore, Heidegger's motivation of Interpreting Dasein's everydayness of 
I-saying is,elearly a phenomenological demonstration of the ontological analytic 
of Dasein. In his refutation to the Cartesian and Kantian ego and 1 think, 
Heidegger strictly follows the phenomenological motto: “To the things 
themselves!" In the examination of them, Heidegger finds that the question of 
Being is missing and the ontological difference of Dasein is omitted. In this 
sense, his criticizes both Descartes and Kant of their incapacity to see the 
phenomenon ofDasein as a Being-in-the-world. 
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However, in the ontological analytic ofDasein's saying “1” in its Being-in-
the-world, Heidegger fmds that "proximally, it is not ‘I,，in the sense ofmy own 
Self, that 'am,' but rather the Others, whose way of Being of the 'They’，，（BT 
167). Does Heidegger dismiss the “I am’，that we think each of us is? Of course 
its answer is negative. It is because Heidegger explains that this way ofBeing is 
ontologically determined. At the same time，the inauthentic mode of Being 
belongs also to Dasein's genuine Being~existence and mineness. Thus, his 
comments the analytic of inauthenticity: “least of all, has our Interpretation been 
surrendered to an artificial way in which Dasein grasps itself; it merely carries 
out the explication ofwhat Dasein itself ontically discloses" (BT 229-30). 
Thus, the “I am" is still valid to answer the question of “who’，of Dasein. 
However, the phenomenal content is disclosed in the Being-in-the-world. In the 
ontical or existentiell level, it is always the “1” in the “I am” The Dasein is still 
mine. 
In a phenomenological perspective’ Heidegger stresses in Being and Time 
and in The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic that Dasein's inauthenticity is 
neutral and a genuine self-manifestation. However, Heidegger does not think that 
Dasein's falling into the world is the only possibility of its existence. Since 
Dasein's constitution ofBeing is care, it has the possibility ofdisclosing its Being 
in its totality and thus, is possible to fmd itself as a Being-in-the-world which is 
always lost and falling into the world. This is the "illumination" for authenticity. 
Authenticity is described in terms of anxiety [Angst], death and resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit]. 
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In the first level, by disclosing itself as a Being-in-the-world, its own being 
"there" in the world is disclosed. The disclosure of its own Being-there opens up 
the literal meaning of Dasein's own existential structure—it is Da-sein, to-be-
there. That Dasein is "there" in the world, engaged and absorbed in the world and 
it is “there” for itself. In a sense, this way of self-disclosure shows a way “that 
Dasein is and has to be" (see BT 171-173). 
However, the self-disclosing and self-finding [sich befmden] always 
accompany with moods [Stimmung] which is ontically the most familiar sort of 
thing. In its existence, Dasein's own Being is the issue and it cannot be 
indifferent to the self-finding as a “there”. In the disclosure of its own Being-
there in the world, Dasein fmds itself lost，and being thrown to the world that 
falling is its own way to be. That Dasein fmds itself "not" being authentic, having 
been lost and has to be so in the future. That makes inauthenticity existentially 
“not neutral". It is “not neutral” in a sense that it gives rise to a mood ofanxiety. 
In the face ofits Being-there, lost in the world, Dasein has the possibility to 
fleet away and fall back to the familiarity and tranquility of the everydayness. 
Otherwise it can choose “to be itself,, facing the disclosure of its own Being and 
discloses its own most Being, to be itself authentically. It all starts from anxiety. 
Anxiety is different from fear [Furcht]. It is not related to Dasein's everyday 
living. Anxiety is the mood that Dasein has when it fmds its “there”，its “that it is 
and has to be. More astonishing, it is a "there" without “whence” [Woher] and 
"whither" [Wohin] Dasein does not know where it is from and where it is going 
to，only thrownness in the world, only its not being itself is disclosed. Anxiety 
individualizes Dasein to the extreme, it pushes Dasein to face itself in an 
authentic sense, not the They,s view, as a “sohs ipse”. This existential solipsism 
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is Dasein's pure disclosure in its own Being. This solipsism has no traditional 
sense other than a pure disclosure ofDasein's mineness.^^ 
An extreme self-disclosure in an anxious individualized Dasein is death. 
Death is the ultimate possibility of impossibility ofDasein，it is most certain and 
belongs to each Dasein's own. In Dasein's everydayness, it always knows that 
“one dies”（BT 297). But in this kind ofidle talk, “one，，means “nobody，，and at 
the end its says, “no, not me” The ‘‘certainty，，of death is disposed in a 
ambiguous manner just in order to weaken that certainty. In this way，dying is 
leveled off and the fear can be relieved. However，this kind of everyday 
tranquility cannot authentically restored. 
Anxiety can only be restored in a resolution in which death is authentically 
anticipated. The anticipation of death is different from awaiting its coming. 
Rather, death is grasped at each moment of self-disclosure and be seen as a 
structural determination of itself. In anticipatory resolution, Dasein discloses its 
Being as a Being-towards-death (see §52). It is not “death is coming" but “I am a 
"Being-towards-death" that is disclosed to Dasein. 
In the project of Being and Time, the explication of the totality ofDasein's � • 
Being has to include Dasein's authentic resolute anticipatory of death (BT 274). 
In this authentic resoluteness, Dasein Being is open also in its authentic 
temporality [Zietlickeit\ That Dasein's care for its own Being shows that Dasein 
is futurally projecting its own potentiality-for-Being considering its end and 
grasps its past (having been lost in the world—its there-being) at once. This 
52 See MFL§10. 
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authentic moment of self-disclosing is an authentic present. In this unitary 
structure of future, past and present, Dasein's Being's Being is disclosed in its 
authentic way. Thus, Dasein is ontologically possible to open up itself not in its 
totality ofBeing in resolute anticipation ofdeath. 
The discussion of authenticity then give rise to a new horizon of time, 
Dasein's Being is shown to need a further explication in terms ofits temporality. 
Indeed, the sixty sections in the earlier parts of Being and Time as a whole is a 
preparation to the explication of Being in terms of Dasein's temporality. 
However, our thesis will not go into the detail. For us, what is in question is an 
understanding ofDasein's Being an 'T'. For most，the discussion of the problem 
o f “ r is due to an ethical concern: What I cannot be myself authentically. In the 
discussion of authenticity, Heidegger's answer may not be satisfying. Heidegger 
does not leave us with a guide for being our authentic self in everyday dealings. 
He may leave us with a crude yet moving description of the structure of 
Being-in-the-world, Dasein's facticity. That we are hopelessly absorbed in the 
everyday dealing and not knowing that in so doing, we become detached from 
our own selves. That we say 'T' in an average manner without giving full 
commitment to our decisions, our judgements and even our responsibility to 
ourselves. However, I wonder very much if Heidegger would really engage 
himself in an ethical issue like that. 
It is clear in the text ofBeing and Time, the issue is Dasein's self-opening to 
its own Being. The understanding of "inauthenticity" in a most literally sense, 
must be referred to whether Dasein discloses its Being adequately. In 
everydayness, though there is a pre-ontological understanding, Dasein always 
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comports itself to the world and its things. It is the structure of Being-in-the-
world. On the other hand, "Authenticity" only refers to the disclosure ofDasein's 
own Being to itself in its totality. This is a complete disclosure of care in the 
authentic temporality. Ifthe problem is Being and its disclosure, the discussion of 
authenticity and inauthenticity would be side-tracked when ethical issue comes to 
the forth. 
However, I believe that there is still the space for inference on ethical 
problems in the light of the Dasein analytic. In Dasein's resoluteness, in the 
affirmation of death and thrownness, there lies the most lyrical hint and the 
firmest call for a retrieval {wiederholen] of ourselves. When thrownness in the 
world is the fate ofmy Dasein, the most challenging reaction to this fate is giving 
it a resolute affirmation—to my dying and to my Being-in-the-world. Heidegger 
writes. 
Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self. As 
resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a 
possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can 
have~~ofrevering the repeatable possibilities of existence (BT 443). 
� 
How is the choice ofresoluteness possible? In Being and Time, it seems that 
Heidegger has never given us an answer. It may deal to his conscious of 
refraining himself from going into the ethical question. But Wiederholung as a 
strong philosophical stream springing from the Neitzsche, Kierkegaard, Jasper 
and the young Heidegger the existentialistic way of answering the ethical 
question concerning authenticity may be the most poetical way of walking out 
from the powerful revealing of our thrown inauthenticity of Being and Time. 
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After all hustles from witnessing Heidegger's existential hermeneutic, we also 
finds the Delphi inscription "Know Thyself means no easy inquiry of curiosity, 
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